(from Spring 2010 Rights Review 3:1)
What one might call “older” constitutional law has been very much in the news lately with the two controversial prorogations by Prime Minister Harper; the Government’s failure to disclose documents relating to Afghan detainees being released by Canadians to face torture; and the Supreme Court of Canada failing to provide a meaningful remedy for the ongoing breach of Omar Khadr’s Charter rights. Khadr, a Canadian citizen, has been held at Guantanamo Bay since 2002 on terrorism and related charges after being captured on Afghan soil. The Court found a serious breach of Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights yet chose not to tread into the realm of foreign affairs by directing the Government of Canada to seek his release from US custody. Though I focus solely here on the Khadr case, the thread common to all of these events is that they all concern exercises of the royal prerogative.
What is the royal prerogative? It is the unfettered discretion that once ran the machinery of government – Charles I described it as absolute and beyond reproach and was later beheaded – of which little remains. Despite the whittling away by statute and practice, what remains of the Crown prerogative is, nevertheless, significant.