Who Can Regulate Canadian Securities?

Monday, July 25, 2011

This commentary by Prof. Jacob Ziegel was first published in the National Post on July 15, 2011.

On April 12 and 13, the Supreme Court of Canada held a two-day hearing on a Reference from the federal government asking the Court to determine the constitutional validity of the proposed Securities Act published by the federal government in May, 2010. The question all the parties to the hearing must now be asking themselves is how the Court is likely to respond to the Reference.

The need for federal securities legislation has been discussed for at least 30 years, yet successive Liberal and Conservative governments refused to bite the bullet. The Harper administration showed greater mettle and became convinced that a national securities regulator was essential for Canada in light of the financial crisis that gripped North America, and much of the rest of the world, in 2007 and 2008. It was also the solution recommended by three federal task forces that were established between 2003 and 2009.

The Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act: Mandatory Risk Assessment

Kenneth Jull is an adjunct professor at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, teaching the course "Financial Crimes and Corporate Compliance".

The Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act ("CFPOA") has been in force since 1999.  In June of 2011 the CFPOA  streaked across the radar screens of compliance officers when Niko Resources Ltd. ("Niko"), a Canadian energy company, plead guilty and paid a fine of almost $10 million  as a result of bribes paid to a Bangladeshi official.  The bribes included a luxury SUV [Toyota Land Cruiser] and a trip to New York and Calgary. 

The large fine is only half of the story. Niko Canada and its subsidiaries were placed on probation requiring that the companies develop compliance procedures based on risk assessment.   The concepts in the prior sentence bear repeating as they are novel in Canada.  The Order pierces the corporate veil to include subsidiaries, places a corporation on probation (as now authorized by the Criminal Code sentencing provisions dealing with organizations) and requires a system of risk assessment. The following paragraph from the probation Order demonstrates the extent to which risk assessment is now a mandatory element of compliance in the anti-corruption arena:

Telus Funds Ignore Governance

This commentary was first published in the Financial Post on April 28, 2012.

The collapse of Magna’s dual-class share structure in 2011 via an insider bid for Frank Stronach’s holdings raised eyebrows because of the unprecedented pay out of an 1,800% premium that Mr. Stronach (through a private holding company) received in the transaction. Dual-class structures are once again in the spotlight with the recent proposal by Telus to eliminate its dual class structure. It was clear that Magna concerned securities regulators at least from a disclosure standpoint. By contrast, regulators have been conspicuously silent on the Telus transaction.

Under the terms of the Telus proposal, which goes to a shareholder vote on May 9, each non-voting share would be converted to a common share on a one-for-one basis. The two classes of shareholders will vote separately on the transaction. Two-thirds approval from each class is required in order for the votes to pass. Thus, a concern about shareholder participation that existed in previous dual class transactions, such as Canadian Tire, falls away since shareholders in each class have a vote.

Profs. Iacobucci and Trebilcock - "How to privatize Canada Post"

Monday, April 16, 2012

In a commentary in the Financial Post, Profs. Edward Iacobucci and Michael Trebilcock analyze the issues that would be involved in privatizing postal services in Canada ("How to privatize Canada Post," March 27, 2012).

Read the full commentary on the Financial Post website.

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