LEGAL THEORY WORKSHOP
presents
Gideon Yaffe
Yale Law School
In Defense of Criminal Possession
Friday, February 28, 2014
12:30 – 2:00
Solarium (room FA2) – Falconer Hall
84 Queen’s Park
Criminal law casebooks and treatises frequently mention the possibility that criminal liability for possession is inconsistent with the Voluntary Act Requirement, which limits criminal liability to that which includes an act or an omission. This paper explains why criminal liability for possession is compatible with the Voluntary Act Requirement despite the fact that possession is a status. To make good on this claim, the paper (1) defends the Voluntary Act Requirement, (2) offers an account of the nature of omissions of the kind that need be included in that for which criminal liability is imposed in the absence of a voluntary act, and (3) argues that possession is a status that is constituted in part by an omission of this sort. The result is that to hold people criminally liable for possession is to hold them criminally liable both for a status and for an omission, an omission that is part of what it is to have that status. The paper also distinguishes possession from vagrancy, which is not a proper object of criminal liability, precisely because of constraints placed by the Voluntary Act Requirement. And the paper argues that possession incident to dispossession is not a proper object of criminal liability because it does not involve an omission of the kind that other forms of possession involve.
Gideon Yaffe is a Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at Yale Law School. Prior to joining Yale in 2012, he was a Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Southern California. His research interests include the philosophy of law, particularly criminal law; the study of metaphysics including causation, free will and personal identity; and the study of intention and the theory of action. He has also written about the history of early modern philosophy. Professor Yaffe is a member of the MacArthur Foundation’s Law and Neuroscience Project and collaborates with several neuroscientists to devise experiments that aim to be of legal and philosophical significance. His 2010 book “Attempts” concerns the philosophical foundations of the law governing attempted crimes. He holds an A.B. in philosophy from Harvard and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Stanford.
The Legal Theory Workshop is not open to the general public. We welcome individuals affiliated with the Faculty of Law and closely related departments, including political science, philosophy, criminology, history and the Centre for Ethics. All other individuals interested in attending must seek prior approval from the organizers of the workshop.
A light lunch will be served.
For more information about this workshop, please contact Nadia Gulezko at n.gulezko@utoronto.ca
