LAW & ECONOMICS WORKSHOP
presents
Heski Bar-Isaac
Rotman School of Management
Reputation with Heterogeneous Audiences:
An Application to Optimal Client Lists
Tuesday, December 3, 2013
4:10 PM
Solarium (Room FA2) - Falconer Hall
84 Queen's Park
This project builds on a wider agenda to understand the implications of reputation-building to audiences who have different information and different preferences (a first paper in this project is available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/ejj7gl6jlg69kv6/RS2M.pdf). In this presentation, I will describe a model that highlights tension between “investing” in audiences who are helpful for sustaining incentives (or, equivalently, allowing the agent to commit to efficient behavior) and “milking” audiences who have a high opinion of the agent as long as they can be persuaded that the agent is working. The model will highlight the trade-off and consider the “client-mix” that maximizes value for the agent, by considering clients who vary in the length of their relationship with an agent, and an agent who is limited in her ability to serve different audiences and must choose which to work with.
Heski Bar-Isaac is an Associate Professor of Integrative Thinking and Business Economics at the Rotman School of Management. He has previously served on the faculty at the Stern School of Business, at New York University, and taught as a visitor at the Sloan School of Business at MIT, the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, and Bocconi University. Prior to his PhD at the LSE, he worked as a consultant for OXERA. Heski has published work in various economics journals including the American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies and RAND Journal of Economics, and is currently serving as an editor of the Journal of Industrial Economics, and associate editor at Economic Journal and Canadian Journal of Economics. He has broad interests on theoretical applications of information economics and industrial organization. Most recently his work has focused on vertical relations and anti-trust, internet economics, and economic theories of reputation.
For more information, please contact Nadia Gulezko at n.gulezko@utoronto.ca.
