The world appears to have arrived, grudgingly in some cases, at a consensus that climate change is a serious environmental threat. The global policy-making machine has slowly creaked into gear. Indeed, various initiatives are now picking up speed on multiple tracks.
On track 1, discussions about new commitments to follow Kyoto post-2012 are taking place under the auspices of the 1992 UN Climate Convention. On track 2, this year’s G8 Summit saw the leading industrialized states endorse the idea of 50% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. On track 3, the Asia-Pacific Climate Partnership, which Canada has now joined, is chugging along towards technological cooperation and an “aspirational” emissions target. On track 4, US President Bush’s climate initiative wants to bring the 15 countries, including China and India, that emit 80% of global greenhouse gases on board. Here too the destination is a “flexible” long-term target.
New thinking on global climate policy is obviously needed, and fast. The main challenge is to engage the major emitters in meaningful action. Not all countries necessarily need to (or should) make emission reduction commitments, or take on the same commitments. The different policy tracks, therefore, are all usefully pursued to explore regulatory options and configurations. But these global brainstorming exercises should not lead us to abandon or even undermine track 1 – the existing UN regime.
Climate change is a global problem, affecting all countries, whether they are large emitters or not. This means that there is a principled reason for a global regime, even if not all states take on the same (or any) emission reduction commitments. Policies adopted within it are also likely to have greater legitimacy than selective arrangements among coalitions of the willing. And only a long-term global regime will send the signals that states and economic sectors need to make costly adjustments.
What is more, the foundations for such a global regime are already in place. The climate convention, which 191 states have joined, spells out a common goal (prevent dangerous greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere) and sets out globally agreed principles to guide treaty development.
Perhaps most important among these is the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” It reflects that fact that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases stems from industrialized countries, and that per capita emissions in developing countries remain relatively low. It recognizes that eradication of poverty and economic growth are legitimate priorities for developing countries and asks industrialized countries to take the lead in combating climate change.
Clearly, in light of emissions trends in some developing countries, no climate change regime will be effective in the long run without their participation. It is also safe to say that no global arrangement will attract that participation unless it respects the principle of differentiation.
It is worth remembering, then, that the oft maligned climate change regime provides the institutional and procedural mechanisms to put such a common but differentiated approach in place.
It has established a forum for regular meetings among parties, and procedures for global decision-making. It also provides the legal hooks for an almost unlimited variety of new commitment tracks. The climate convention itself could be amended to include different sets of commitments for different groups of states. Alternatively, the Kyoto Protocol could be amended, or replaced by one or several new protocols. Through these devices, future commitments can be differentiated as between developing and industrialized states, and among developing and industrialized states, respectively.
In addition, the existing regime stipulates common methodologies for emissions inventories, rigorous reporting requirements, and elaborate performance evaluation processes. It also contains the foundations for global emissions trading and a compulsory compliance assessment and enforcement procedure. All of these are key ingredients for an effective global approach.
It may or may not be a coincidence that the some of very leaders who have dragged their heels through the shifting sands of public opinion are now most actively promoting new international climate initiatives. But they, and the publics to whom they are accountable, should remember that much of what they are now proposing is already in place, or is best pursued, under the existing climate regime. The problem lies not with the regime but with the states that are, or should be, participating in it – including Canada.
Jutta Brunnée
Metcalf Chair in Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto