According to UN secretary-general, Ban Ki- Moon, the most recent findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggest that the impacts of climate change will be “so severe and so sweeping that only urgent, global action will do.”
The challenge at the pending UN meetings in Bali will be to set the tracks for just that: a regime that includes all major greenhouse gas (ghg) emitters and imposes meaningful emission reduction targets on them.
Canada’s Environment Minister, John Baird, has called the IPCC findings “powerful” and “overwhelming.” Assuming, then, that Canada’s goal is to promote urgent and global action, what of its negotiating strategy for Bali?
That strategy was spelled out at last weekend’s Kampala meeting of the 53 Commonwealth states. Canada blocked a final communiqué that would have called for a long-term global target, as well as binding commitments to deep, absolute emission reductions by developed countries. The statement’s focus on developed countries was the rub. As Prime Minister Harper confirmed, Canada will resist any deal that does not include all major polluters.
Fair enough, one might say. This is a sensible response to the collective action dilemma posed by climate change. It makes no sense for any major emitter to take costly action unless it is assured that others will do the same, in part because only collective action by all major emitters can actually solve the problem.
Consider then the strikingly different approach taken by the European Union to getting global buy-in. In light of IPCC findings, the EU calls for action that ensures that global emissions peak in the next 10-15 years, and for a 50% reduction of emissions below 1990 levels by 2050.
According to the EU, the initial benchmark for global emissions can be met through emission reductions of 30% by developed countries by 2020. Developing countries would not initially be asked for absolute reductions, but would be expected to begin reducing the growth of their emissions.
Yet, emissions by developing countries are projected to surpass the total emissions of industrialized countries by 2020. Therefore, major developing countries would have to commit to reductions of 50% below 1990 levels by 2050, while developed nations would be required to reduce their emissions by 60-80%.
This staged and differentiated approach to emission reductions, according to the EU, reflects the historical contributions by industrialized countries to current ghg concentrations in the atmosphere, as well as their larger technological and financial capacity.
So, which approach is more likely to win developing countries over?
The EU strategy is anchored in the objective of UN climate convention (to avert dangerous climate change) and the principles that underpin the UN regime, notably the idea that states have “common but differentiated responsibilities” to address the climate challenge. The bet is that this tack will be most persuasive, especially with developing countries that perceive global climate politics as perpetuating long-standing North-South inequities.
By contrast, Canada’s Prime Minister stated in Kampala: “We already did the ‘one-third of the countries will take binding targets and let's hope the rest fall into line.’ … That hasn't worked. … That was the Kyoto mistake.” It seems the calculation now is that the best way to get large developing countries like China and India to commit is to make clear that no action will be taken without them. Since developing countries are also most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, this should bring them on board. But will it?
Again, the EU takes the opposite approach. It has agreed to unilaterally reduce its emissions by at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, and by 30% if other industrialized nations join the effort. Granted, various factors, including so-called “wall-fall profits” (favourable emission trends due to the enlargement of the EU to include Eastern European countries), enable the EU to make this pledge.
Still, in comparison Canada’s rhetoric rings hollow. The Conservative government aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 – compared to 2006 levels. Under this plan, Canadian 2020 emissions would almost certainly be above the 1990 levels that are the global benchmark for reductions. Indeed, while it claims to support binding targets, Canada also calls for a regime that would allow all states flexibility to choose their own approach.
Canada’s approach could conceivably assist a global deal. The government points to the Commonwealth and APEC statements, both of which were endorsed by developing and developed countries. The trouble is that Canada’s proposal does not chart a clear course towards meaningful, urgent action.
Whether or not it is right in all the specifics, the EU is far ahead of Canada in formulating such a comprehensive policy. Meanwhile, the Australian Prime Minister elect is taking preparations to have his country, one of the major Kyoto hold-outs, ratify the agreement. And if the climate policy landscape in the US continues to shift towards re-engagement, Canada may soon find itself isolated.
Our strategy for global climate policy cannot be to arrange deck chairs while leaving the Titanic on course. Sure, if we wait long enough there will be no icebergs left to collide with. But then what?