The Significance of Khadr: Part I

Khadr is a highly significant judgment, for a number of different reasons.  For Omar Khadr himself, the Court held that he has a constitutional right to the disclosure of the interrogations conducted by Canadian officials in Guantanamo Bay, some or all of which were shared with American authorities.  For the international campaign to close Guantanamo Bay, the Supreme Court has added its voice to the chorus of informed legal opinion in stating that the regime in Guantanamo Bay – at least at the time of the interrogations – violated the Geneva Conventions, which guarantee fundamental human rights to armed combatants.

But the judgment is potentially of much wider significance. Khadr is the latest in a line of cases in which the Court has been asked to set out the precise application of the Charter in situations where Canada cooperates with foreign governments in the national security context.  Canada works with foreign governments in different ways.  For example, it may share intelligence, which foreign governments may then act upon to arrest, detain, interrogate and even torture an individual – as tragically occurred in the case of Maher Arar.  In other situations, Canadian officials may themselves be abroad – such as the CSIS officers who interrogated Omar Khadr in Guantanamo Bay, or Canadian armed forces in Afghanistan.  Canada may also cooperate with foreign governments through extradition and deportation.

The Significance of Khadr - Part II

In my previous post, I talked about the new ground broken by Khadr.  In this post, I want to identify and offer preliminary reflections on some important questions raised by the judgment.  First, though, full disclosure: I was counsel for the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association in the appeal.  Second, a disclaimer: these views are strictly my own.

To recall, in my last post, I wrote

Suresh established what we termed the “doctrine of constitutional complicity”, which holds that Canada is constitutionally liable for human rights abuses committed by foreign states which occur outside of Canada when (a) such abuses would violate the Charter had they occurred in Canada at the hands of the Canadian government; and (b) Canada has been complicit in the human rights abuses of the foreign state.

Guilt by Association? Not Quite

This commentary was published in the Toronto Star on September 30, 2008.

The recent conviction of a young offender in the Toronto terrorism case has raised concerns that his conviction was a form of guilt by association. The Crown's star witness, Mubin Shaikh, was quick to tell reporters that he did not believe the young man was a terrorist. That said, those who read Justice John R. Sproat's 98-page decision will know that the legal issue is not quite so simple.

The young man was charged under a new offence created by the Anti-Terrorism Act enacted in December 2001 in the wake of 9/11. It provides a broad offence of participating in the activities of a terrorist group. To be guilty of this offence, the Crown must prove that the accused knew he was participating or contributing to a terrorist group and was doing so for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity.

In other words, one does not have to be a terrorist who is planning a specific terrorist act to be guilty under this offence.

The Omar Khadr Case: Redefining War Crimes

This commentary was first published on the Jurist website on October 31, 2008.

George W. Bush’s term as president is coming to an end, and he has little to show by way of meting out justice for the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Perhaps this is why his administration seems so desperate to score a victory on the judicial battleground of the military commissions. That its target is Omar Khadr, a child soldier at the time of the alleged offenses, makes the spectacle all the more pathetic to the observer, and tragic for Khadr.

The charges against Khadr include “murder in violation of the laws of war,” and providing material support to the enemy. The most serious allegation against him is that on July 27, 2002 in Afghanistan, he threw a grenade that killed US soldier Sergeant Christopher Speer. Indeed, until a few months ago, the official story went unchallenged in the public domain. Thanks to an inadvertent government leak, we have since learned of evidence supporting at least two alternate scenarios, namely that another combatant might have thrown the grenade or that Sgt. Speer was killed by “friendly fire.”

It's a Legal Maze for Canadian Authorities Abroad

This commentary by Prof. Ed Morgan was first published in The Globe and Mail on May 27, 2009.

Canadians may be surprised to learn a few things about our constitutional law.

First, the military owes no duty toward detainees arrested by us and turned over to a foreign state for custody.

Second, our intelligence service does owe a duty toward prisoners taken into custody by a foreign state and turned over to us for interrogation.

Third, our diplomats are obliged to intervene with a foreign legal system that fails to live up to our domestic standards of punishment.

And fourth, our police are free to comply with a foreign legal system that fails to live up to our domestic standards of search and seizure.

When it comes to the powers of the Canadian government abroad, each new court ruling makes us wonder if the judges took the time to read the last one. How did this confused state of affairs come to be?

How to Tame a Prerogative

From The Globe and Mail (March 10, 2010)

Opposition efforts to get at the facts about Afghan detainee abuse appear not to have entirely abated, despite former Supreme Court of Canada justice Frank Iacobucci's appointment to advise the government about releasing documents. Prime Minister Stephen Harper's constitutional footwork certainly did not do the trick. Prorogation simply will not erase the stain of Canadians handing over Afghan detainees to face torture, if accusations are true. The break also should not allow him to escape the House's motion calling for uncensored documents relating to the abuse allegations.

Up until the day before the motion in December, the government side claimed that a variety of statutes legally barred it from releasing documents that threatened national security. It was only then that Carolyn Kobernick, assistant deputy minister in the Department of Justice, acknowledged that there was no statutory basis for refusing to deliver unredacted documents.

Instead, Ms. Kobernick claimed that the government, when making decisions regarding disclosure, would be guided by “the values underlying Parliament's intention in these provisions” – namely, “to protect the national security of Canada from harm by the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information.” So there was no legal bar to the production of unredacted documents, only a discretion guided by values underlying the law.

The UN’s Failed Response to 9/11

A decade ago, the world rightly stood in solidarity with the United States in the face of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The story of how the Bush Administration squandered that solidarity through Guantanamo, torture and the invasion Iraq is well known. Less well known is how the United Nations also lost its opportunity to unite world in principled counter-terrorism.

The 9/11 attacks provided the U.N. with an unparalleled opportunity to forge international agreement on a definition of terrorism. Whatever previous disagreements there were about freedom fighting and state terrorism, it was clear that the 9/11 attacks constituted terrorism. The killing of innocent people not engaged in hostilities in an armed conflict was terrorism; it did not matter whether they were in the planes, the World Trade Centre or the Pentagon.

On September 28, 2001, the Security Council demanded that all states enact tough counter-terrorism measures under its mandatory powers to enforce international peace and security. The Security Council offered no guidance on the definition of terrorism. It failed to so, even though a 1999 Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Financing previously included a restrained but principled definition:  the intentional killing or injuring of those not engaged in armed conflict in order to intimidate a population or compel governments to act.

Aggression v. Atrocity in the History of International Law

Columbia University history professor Samuel Moyn (visiting at Yale Law School in the spring term of 2012) has recently posted his paper From Antiwar Politics to Antitorture Politics on SSRN, a paper I heard him present at a November session of the Critical Analysis of Law workshop at my law school, the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.  I have written about it on JOTWELL because it is an excellent paper, which law professors might not otherwise hear about, offering an extremely thoughtful intervention on the recent history of international law.

Foreign Affairs: A Delicate Balancing Act

This article by Prof. Ed Morgan was originally published in The Lawyers Weekly, April 13, 2012.

When it comes to conducting foreign affairs, it is well established that the constitution puts the weight of responsibility on the federal government. But in recent years, the courts have deviated from that rule as often as they have invoked it.

In the Afghan prisoners case, the Federal Court of Canada explained that the government owes no constitutional duty when, after questioning, the military turns detainees over to a foreign government. The judgment presumed that Canadian forces require flexibility, and enjoy the discretion to deviate from domestic rules when they deal with an allied state and prisoners of war.

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