Gender and Equality in Muslim Family Law
Justice and Ethics in the Islamic Legal Tradition

Edited by Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen and Christian Moe
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Acknowledgements**

vii

**A note on transliteration and other conventions**

viii

**Introduction: Muslim Family Law and the Question of Equality**

Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen and Christian Moe


Ziba Mir-Hosseini

7

**Part I: Perspectives on Reality**

2. Qiwāma in Egyptian Family Laws: 'Wifely Obedience' between Legal Texts, Courtroom Practices and Realities of Marriages

Muiki Al-Sharmani

37

3. Egyptian Women's Rights NGOs: Personal Status Law Reform between Islamic and International Human Rights Law

Marwa Sharafeldin

57

4. The Religious Arguments in the Debate on the Reform of the Moroccan Family Code

Aicha El Hajjami

81

5. From Local to Global: Sisters in Islam and the Making of Musawah: A Global Movement for Equality in the Muslim Family

Zainah Anwar

107
11

THE PARADOX OF EQUALITY AND
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

Gender Equality, Islamic Law and the Modern
Muslim State†

Anver M. Emon

1. Introduction

The pursuit of gender equality in Islamic family law, as codified in various Muslim
states, is neither a new phenomenon nor one that is lacking considerable study.
Indeed, many scholarly monographs, edited collections and academic journals
present thoughtful, well-researched and passionate contributions that are animated
by the goal of gender justice in the Muslim world. This chapter is indebted to that
vast body of literature, and, indeed, is a humble offering that stands in the shadow
of all that has come before. The aim of this chapter is to bring the reader’s attention
to a subtle irony that underlies the pursuit of justice. That irony has everything to
do with what is often called the ‘paradox of equality’. If equality requires the same
treatment of those who are similarly situated, the paradox of equality reminds us
that we cannot treat similarly those who are not similarly situated. Indeed, there are
times when justice demands that we legally differentiate between people because
of their differences.†
Legal differentiation is a common feature of the law, a *sine qua non* of justice. To take a rather mundane and perhaps indelicate example, we often find separate bathrooms for men and women. Furthermore, in the interest of accommodating the needs of those who are disabled, we may create yet a third bathroom that is specially designated for them and equipped with certain devices designed to aid those who might require assistance. We may even argue (andconvincingly so) that differentiation in these cases is right, good and just. In all these cases, though, we cannot deny that men and women are treated differently, and that the disabled are treated differently again. For some, this example might seem silly; it is so banal that they might think it takes us away from the hard cases of equality that find expression in the contributions to this volume. However, this example is offered to emphasise an important dynamic that underlies the paradox of equality. Arguably, this example is only banal because we consider the differences between men, women and the disabled in this specific situation so obvious, indeed *so very natural*, as to require virtually no argument or rationale to explain why differentiation occurs and is laudable. The presumption of naturalness is key to understanding the basis by which differentiation is often justified and legitimated. From a critical perspective, though, that presumption demands our greatest attention and vigilance lest it be used as post-hoc justification to discriminate. As Joan W. Scott reminds us, 'paternity was often given as the explanation for the exclusion of women from politics, race as the reason for the enslavement and/or subjugation of blacks, when in fact the causality runs the other way: processes of social differentiation produce the exclusions and enslavements that are then justified in terms of biology or race', or, in other words, in terms of presumptions of what we consider obvious, unavoidable and natural. For example, the banality of the example above disappears once we consider access to bathrooms in the Jim Crow era in the twentieth-century United States, when African Americans had to use separate, and often deficient, facilities. The recent novel, *The Help*, which has become a major motion picture, depicts how presumptions of natural differences could justify what would now be considered highly discriminatory allocations of access to washrooms.

In this simple, if admittedly vulgar, example, we see the paradox of equality at work - sometimes people have to be treated differently in order for justice to be served. They are treated differently because of some characteristic or feature that is deemed so natural as to warrant differentiation. Yet, the example also illustrates how presumptions of natural difference must be subjected to vigilant scrutiny lest differentiation become unjust because it is discriminatory. Differentiation, as used in this chapter, is distinct from discrimination. Discrimination is an evaluation that a particular differentiation constitutes disadvantages against a particular group *and* that such disadvantages render the differentiation *illegitimate*. Legal differentiation by itself is, therefore, a common and expected feature of the law. The paradox of equality offers analytic bite by asking whether the presumptions under which a particular factual difference leads to a legal differentiation may be discriminatory, and thereby illegitimate under the law.

This chapter approaches the question of gender equality from the vantage point of the paradox of equality. Instead of focusing narrowly on whether and how women are discriminated against, and challenging the role of patriarchy in animating such discrimination, this chapter will step back and instead inquire whether and why differentiation in the law is justified and legitimated, and explore how legal differentiation in one context can be discrimination in another. The chapter will, thereby, distinguish between factual difference, legal differentiation and discrimination. These distinctions are significant because they open important questions that all too often remain unaddressed: what makes certain factual differences irrelevant as a matter of law, while others are legitimate bases for legal differentiation, and yet others are deemed discriminatory and thereby illegitimate as a basis for legal differentiation? For instance, the factual difference between a 5-year-old and a 6-year-old boy may not matter in terms of how one measures the relevant standard of care in the Common Law of Tort, where the boy is sued for negligently injuring another child. But the factual difference between a 5-year-old boy and a 17-year-old boy provides a basis for legal differentiation: the 17-year-old will be held to a higher standard of care.

This chapter contributes to the existing literature on gender, equality and Islamic law by interrogating the nuances of equality from the vantage point of the paradox of equality. Part 2 examines the different strategies used by those advocating gender equality in the Muslim family. Part 3 illustrates how the paradox of equality is an ancient concept with roots in both Greek and Islamic philosophy. Part 4 shows how the vantage point of the paradox of equality allows us to critically question and explore the assumptions that animate the development of legal rules that differentiate and discriminate against people on different grounds. Parts 5 and 6 examine how Islamic law has legitimised differential treatment of men and women by reference both to the law and to extra-legal factors associated with the post-colonial condition of Muslim societies. Part 7 brings the analysis to a close by suggesting that to shift what the historical tradition represents as legal differentiation between men and women to be discriminatory, and thereby illegitimate as a matter of Islamic law, will involve both legal and extra-legal factors. Drawing upon scholarship about the women's movement in the United States, this chapter suggests that legal change in the Muslim world will require more than just attentiveness to the intricacies of legal texts and legal reasoning. It will require social movements to occupy the streets and articulate alternative legal outcomes to expand the scope of what is legally intelligible, meaningful and possible. This chapter implicitly suggests that social movements would do well to bear in mind the paradox of equality as they design their research and activist agendas. The paradox of equality helps to identify the unstated assumptions that make legal differentiation possible,
thereby quietly justifying what is tantamount to discriminatory treatment against women under the law in some Muslim countries.

2. Equality in Muslim reformist writings

A review of literature concerning gender and justice in Islamic law shows that Muslim writers begin from the starting point of a patriarchy that is either considered embedded in the tradition or imposed upon it from outside. For instance, Fatima Mernissi, in her path-breaking work, writes in an autobiographical moment: 'When I finished writing this book I had come to understand one thing; if women’s rights are a problem for some modern Muslim men, it is neither because of the Koran nor the Prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because those rights conflict with the interests of a male elite.' Others note that patriarchy can certainly be read from the main source-texts of Islam, such as the Qur’an, but are keen to suggest that patriarchy is separable from the Qur’an’s message. Asma Barlas acknowledges that describing the Qur’an as patriarchal is anarchonistic at best. Rather, the aim of her book is to ‘challenge oppressive readings of the Qur’an’ and ‘to offer a reading that confirms that Muslim women can struggle for equality from within the framework of the Qur’an’s teachings’.

Acknowledging that patriarchal readings of the Qur’an abound, Barlas nonetheless seeks to find a way to gender equality through the sacred text. A third approach, complementary to Barlas’, is the hermeneutic approach of Farid Esack. Rejecting predominant paradigms of gender relations that perpetuate existing power imbalances between men and women, Esack reads the Qur’an through the hermeneutic lens of justice, and not mere kindness, given that the former proffers modes of redress while the latter does not necessarily do so, and as such perpetuates the existence of oppression.

Theories of interpretation are proffered, building on hermeneutic principles of justice in light of the relationship between the reader, the text and meaning.

At the heart of these writers’ concerns is the need to recognise and articulate a conception of gender equality as a character of justice in Islam. However, the meaning and implications of gender equality are not always shared between them. For Mernissi, equality is captured in the language of common and shared ‘rights’ at the political, social and sexual level. She correlates this rights-oriented view of equality with the historic independence of Muslim states from colonial subjugation. These new states were ‘born’ into an international system of equal and sovereign states, where the aspiration to democracy, constitutionalism and rule of law forced a recognition of the individual as citizen. As new Muslim states entered the international community and redefined themselves, ‘in the eyes of their former colonizers, they were forced to grant their new citizenship to all their new nationals, men and women … The metamorphosis of the Muslim woman, from a veiled, sequestered, marginalized object reduced to inertia, into a subject with constitutional rights, erased the lines that defined the identity hierarchy which organized politics and relations between the sexes.’ Esack’s equality, arguably, is one that draws upon presumptions about the state, constitutionalism and the citizen as rights bearer. Likewise, Esack’s passionate plea for gender justice perpetuates the language of rights. When writing about the rights ‘given’ to Muslim women, he asks: ‘Are human rights a gift awarded to well-behaved little children as if women … exist outside the world of Islam … in the same way that children are seemingly external to the world of adults?’ Esack uses the language of rights to characterise his agenda of gender justice, which is constituted by a commitment to equality. ‘The right to self-respect, dignity, and equality comes with our very humanness.’ When Mernissi and Esack write about ‘equality’, they have in mind a particular substantive content that arguably echoes the language of classical liberal notions of rights. Whether defined by a constitution that grants rights pursuant to general human rights norms, or even human rights treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, equality for both authors reflects a certain content (namely, a liberal one), expressed in terms of rights.

Departing from the rights-based models of equality, Barlas’ approach recognises that justice may, in fact, require legal differentiation; in other words, she invokes the ‘paradox of equality.’ In her attempt to un-read patriarchy in the Qur’an, Barlas argues that the Qur’an is egalitarian and anti-patriarchal. But she cautions that this does not mean that the Qur’an does not treat men and women differently. Rather, sexual equality need not mean the absence of differential treatment. She writes:

[While there is no universally shared definition of sexual equality, there is a pervasive (and oftentimes pervasive) tendency to view differences as evidence of inequality. In light of this view, the Qur’an’s different treatment of women and men with respect to certain issues (marriage, divorce, giving of evidence, etc.) is seen as manifest proof of its anti-equality stance and its patriarchal nature. However, I argue against this view on the grounds both that … treating women and men differently does not always amount to treating them unequally, nor does treating them identically necessarily mean treating them equally.]

To be anti-patriarchal does not mean that factual difference must be obscured, or that legal differentiation must be avoided at all times and places.

The examples of Mernissi, Esack and Barlas are offered to show different ways in which gender justice and equality are framed in contemporary debates on Islamic law. The specific agenda of each author is less relevant for this chapter; what is more significant are their different approaches to the notion of equality. One approach implicitly conveys a liberal-sounding rights-based approach to the content of equality. Another views equality and justice as requiring a determination of whether differences exist in fact, and whether those factual differences
justify differential treatment, or whether such differential treatment might actually be discriminatory, and thereby illegitimate. This latter approach to equality is particularly important for this chapter, as it explores the analytic contribution of the 'paradox of equality' to the future of gender equality in the Muslim world.

3. The paradox of equality

The paradox of equality is that, as a principle of justice, it recognises that equality is not merely about being treated the same. Rather, the paradox reveals that equality as a matter of law is not only about treating two things equally because they are the same or share a quality of sameness. Equality as a matter of law must also treat two people differently when they are deemed to be sufficiently different, as a matter of fact, to warrant or justify such legal differentiation. Indeed, to treat different people as the same might lead to injustice or, at the very least, considerable discomfort. By bringing forward the contrasting tendencies in equality, the paradox of equality requires us to distinguish between the fact of sameness and difference, and the normative implications given to that factual sameness or difference. That distinction then begs certain fundamental and difficult questions: when and under what conditions should a certain factual difference between two people lead to and justify legal differentiation that entails different distributions of resources and different sets of rights claims? And under what circumstances does that legal differentiation become discriminatory? For instance, in various constitutional democracies, both men and women have the right to vote. In this case, gender difference is irrelevant (although that was not always the case). On the other hand, because of the factual difference of gender, public toilets are generally gender segregated—a normative differentiation. In contrast, a rule that prohibits abortion is discriminatory given the undue burden such a rule places upon women, while men suffer no such burden. In all three cases, the normative or legal implication of factual difference resonates differently; the paradox of equality alerts us to the different registers, and begs important questions about the conditions under which a factual difference matters or not.

This chapter interrogates the nature of equality by interrogating the dynamics of the paradox of equality. Equality, differentiation and discrimination are terms of art that alert us to the fact of difference. They prompt us to inquire whether and why a particular factual difference can or must imply legitimised forms of differentiation, and the conditions under which such differentiation may actually be discriminatory. This approach to equality and discrimination allows us to unpack the assumptions of justice that underlie rules which differentiate between people, and subject those assumptions of justice to critical scrutiny. In doing so, this chapter will make plain the need for multiple strategies to counter the presumptions that perpetuate the legitimacy of legal differentiations which have discriminatory features and impact.

a. Islamic philosophy, musâwa and the paradox of equality

Approaching the issue of equality in light of its paradoxical quality allows us to adopt a critical stance on the pre-modern Islamic legal tradition without, at the same time, uncritically reading into that critique liberal notions of equality. Furthermore, to think about equality in terms of the paradox draws upon a principle of justice that, arguably, is shared across traditions. For instance, in his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote about justice as equality: 'Now since an unjust man is one who is unfair, and the unjust is the unequal, it is clear that corresponding to the unequal there is a mean, namely that which is equal; for every action admitting of more and less admits of the equal also. If then the unjust is the unequal, the just is the equal—an idea that commends itself to all without proof.'

This view about justice as equality finds expression centuries later in the works of Muslim philosophers writing about justice. The pre-modern Muslim philosopher al-Farabi (d. 950), for instance, held that at its foundation, justice ('adl) has to do with distributional equality of the goods in society, and thereafter the protection of each person's enjoyment of his or her share. He wrote:

Justice, initially, is in [demarcating] the portion of the shared goods (qisma al-khayrât al-musâwât) that are for all in the city. Thereafter, [justice] has to do with preserving the distribution among them. Those goods (khayrât) consist of security, property, dignity, rank, and all the goods that are possible for all to share in. Each person among the people of the city has an equal share (musâwa) of these goods based on his worth (istihâl). To diminish or exceed his portion is unjust (jawr). Any diminishment is unjust toward the individual. Any increase is unjust to the people of the city. Perhaps any diminishment is also unjust to the people of the city.

The later pre-modern Muslim philosopher on ethics, Miskawayh (d. 1030) addressed, in his Tahâdhîb al-Akhlaq, the relationship between the just person, the pursuit of equality, and the way in which both result in a unity of the 'highest honour and most eminent rank'. He stated:

The truly just man is he who harmonizes all his faculties, activities, and states in such a way that none exceeds the others. He then proceeds to pursue the same end in the transactions and the honors which are external to him, desiring in all of this the virtue of justice itself and not any other object. . . . And justice, being a mean between extremes and a disposition by which one is able to restore both excess and deficiency to a mean, becomes the most perfect of virtues and the one which is nearest to unity.

For Miskawayh, the pursuit of justice is the pursuit of the mean between extremes, and the pursuit of the mean has to do with ensuring equal distributions among
similarly situated individuals. Various terms that are derived from the Arabic word for justice point to the importance of balance and equality (musāwa). Indeed, equality is the noblest of all proportions for [in its basic meaning, it is unity or a shadow of unity], thus alluding to the oneness and unity of God at the heart of Islamic beliefs.

For the three philosophers, though, equality does not prescribe that we treat each person in the polity exactly like the other. Indeed, all seem to recognize that the just portion that each enjoys will depend, in part, on how one person relates to another. There may be good reasons to differentiate between people, hence invoking the paradox of equality. Al-Farabi’s reference to justice as equal distribution based on one’s worth or value (isti’hāl) suggests that equal distribution to all is not the goal of justice. Rather, justice is about equal treatment of those who are considered equals. But factual differences between people may shift the balance of equality, requiring different allocations to different people in the interest of justice. In this case, legal differentiation is not only appropriate, but a constitutive feature of justice. For instance, Aristotle wrote:

And there will be the same equality between shares as between the persons, since the ratio between the shares will be equal to the ratio between the persons: for if the persons are not equal, they will not have equal shares; it is when equals possess or are allotted unequal shares, or when persons not equal equal shares, that quarrels and complaints arise.

Miskawayh, referring to a shoemaker and carpenter, acknowledged that their respective products will have different worth. Thus when the shoemaker takes from the carpenter the latter’s product and gives him his own, the exchange between them is a barter if the two articles are equal in value. But there is nothing which prevents the product of the one from being superior in value to that of the other. In other words, it may be that one product is worth more than the other, thereby requiring more than a one-to-one exchange.

The example above is embedded in the context of commerce and barter. But it nonetheless begs the question: what determines whether two people are factually different, and whether justice demands that their factual difference requires different distributions, whether of property, dignity or standing in society? The answer to this question may differ depending on the good to be distributed, but it illustrates a difficulty in the way we account for justice as equality. Justice as equality seems to presume a standard by which we judge whether people are, in fact, equally situated, as well as a standard to determine which factual differences are normatively relevant and which are not. In the case of commodities of exchange, we might use an intermediary device, such as money or the market, to offer an accepted standard by which to measure difference, and to account for which differences matter, for the purpose of setting comparative price points. However, what operates as a measure or standard of equality and justice when the goods being distributed are not commodities of exchange, but rather the freedoms and liberties we can enjoy under the law? Will the scope of freedom depend on whether we are black or white, part of the religious majority or a member of a religious minority, a man or a woman? On what basis is factual difference rendered sufficiently relevant to justify differentiation under the law?

4. From musāwa to ḥusn and qubh: legitimating differentiation in Islamic law

The philosophical approach to equality introduces the paradox of equality as an analytic vantage point from which to identify and critique the assumptions that animate rules (formal or otherwise) which legitimate differentiation. But on what bases are factual differences deemed sufficient to justify such differentiation? The philosophical approach to the paradox of equality begs the question, but does not necessarily help us answer that question. Rather, as will be suggested in this section, the move from factual difference to legal differentiation involves a variety of value judgements, which enter into the realm of law and animate and legitimate rules that differentiate between peoples. Two Arabic terms of art, ḥusn and qubh, offer conceptual sites through which such value judgements enter into a legal inquiry. Ḥusn and qubh, which literally mean ‘good’ and ‘bad’ respectively, are ethical terms of art utilised in the genre of usūl al-fiqh and, importantly for this chapter, reflect the interpretive dynamic of jurists moving from ethical determinations of the good and the bad, to legal rules of obligation and prohibition. By attending to the ways in which Muslim jurists moved from ethical norms to legal rules, we can identify the assumptions they imported into their determinations of legitimate differentiation between two people, so as to facilitate critique about the normative significance of the factual difference between them, and the discriminatory effect of any differentiation.

In Sunni usūl al-fiqh treatises, for instance, the terms ḥusn and qubh were invoked in debates about the ontological authority of reason as a source of law when there is an absence of guidance from foundational source-texts, such as the Qur’an (mīn qabla wūray al-sharīʿ). In his chapter in this volume, Mohsen Kadiyar addresses a similar theoretical issue with regard to the Shi’a Usulīs. For these jurists, the question was whether reason has sufficient authority to be a source of Shari’a norms, with the threat of divine sanction or promise of divine reward. Some allowed such a possibility, while others suggested that claims about the good and the bad are certainly morally relevant, but have no bearing on legal obligations and prohibitions. Exploring the intricacies of these terms and their implications for law and philosophy is beyond the scope of this chapter.
One issue of that debate, though, is particularly relevant here, namely, the issue of determinacy. When ascertaining the substantive content of the good and the bad, jurists were concerned with the extent to which their reasoned deliberations about the good and the bad reflected a determinable divine will, or whether they were historically contingent attitudes that had less to do with God and more to do with the human condition prevailing at a given moment. For instance, the pre-modern Shafi'i jurist al-Juwayni (d. 1085) exercised considerable caution when attributing a particular rule of decision to God, since the justifications for any particular legal rule are vulnerable to human contingency and fallibility. Al-Juwayni did not deny that reason enables us to judge if something is dangerous (ijtináb al-mahálík) or offers certain benefits (ibtiídár al-manáfí). To deny this, he held, would be unreasonable (kharýj 'an al-ma'gul). Such moral reasoning falls within the normal capacity of human activity, or what al-Juwayni called the haqq al-idamiyín. But this is different from asking what is good or bad in terms of God's judgement (bukm Alláh). For al-Juwayni, God's determination of an act's Shari'a-value has an authority that human reason cannot enjoy. In Shari'a, whether something is obligatory or prohibited depends on whether God has provided punishment or reward for the relevant acts. Unless we have indicators from God, such matters are unknowable by humans (wa dhálíka ghayb). We cannot make Shari'a judgements, based purely on a rational analysis, into harms and benefits, since any such conclusion offers no authority to justify divine sanction, whether in this life only or in the hereafter. This does not mean that we cannot make moral determinations of good and bad. Indeed, it is natural that we would do so. But we can do so only on issues not already addressed by God, and we cannot claim divine authority for them since God has made no decision on them. As al-Juwayni said, 'it is not prohibited to investigate these two characteristics [i.e. búsí and qubh] where harm may arise or where benefit is possible, on condition that [any determination] not be attributed to God, or obligate God to punish or reward.'

In this passage, al-Juwayni predominantly worried about the authority of reason and the omnipotence of God. But his concern was, no doubt, animated by an anxiety about whether we presume too much when we legislate in the name of God, based on the contingencies of our moral vision. We cannot be certain that our analysis of God's position is objectively true or right. We may only have an approximation of God's will, or we might have a strong conviction short of certainty that our position is right. In other words, far from being true or right, any legal conclusion bears the authority that arises from the jurist's most compelling opinion, or what al-Juwayni called ghalafulat al-zann. It is something less than certainty, but is sufficient for the purpose of decreeing a rule of law, as long as we understand that the authority of the rule is thereby limited.

Consequently, the concern about the authority of reason is tied to the authority of the law in light of the epistemic frailty of the human agent, who must, at times, interpret the law without any express evidence of God's will. This anxiety about truth and objectivity allows us to appreciate that, at a certain level, jurists were aware that fiqih pronouncements are built upon a certain degree of human subjectivity, thereby rendering any fiqih rule vulnerable to a subjectivist critique. We cannot ignore this fact when considering how factual differences are deemed sufficiently relevant to justify legal differentiation. When jurists used terms like búsí and qubh, they utilised these general, technical terms to give an objective frame to their own historically conditioned attitudes and predispositions about when factual differences should lead to legal differentiation.

For instance, the pre-modern Ash'arite theologian al-Baqillani (d. 1032) argued that one can rationally know the good (búsí al-fa) or the bad (qubh) of an act, where such notions are general and abstract. One can make determinations of the bad, for example, on the basis of what one finds distasteful (tanfuru 'anhu al-nufus). To illustrate his point, al-Baqillani argued that one can know, without reference to scripture, the goodness of the believer striking the unbeliever, and the badness of the unbeliever striking the believer. For al-Baqillani this distinction seemed obvious and apparent (a differentiation), whereas to modern readers it may seem abhorrent and unjustifiable (discriminatory). How might we understand al-Baqillani's normative claims regarding the factual difference of religious diversity? The paradox of equality immediately alerts us to consider al-Baqillani's underlying assumptions, which rendered the factual difference between the believer and non-believer sufficiently relevant to justify differentiation.

If we view al-Baqillani's conclusion in the light of the more general set of rules governing the unbeliever, in particular the dhimmí, we find a complex legal, historical and political dynamic at work. The dhimmí was the non-Muslim permanent resident in Islamic lands. Jurists erected various rules governing and restricting the freedoms and liberties of dhimmís in the Muslim polity; they did so in part because they deemed the factual difference in religious commitment between the Muslim and the dhimmí relevant to justifying differential treatment under the law. To understand why the factual difference of religious diversity occasioned a differential legal regime requires understanding the socio-political and cultural context that gave intelligibility to the dhimmí rules.

The dhimmí rules arose amidst a historical backdrop of Muslim conquest of lands, reaching from Spain to India by the eighth century CE. In this context of conquest and colonial rule arose the Pact of 'Umar, as an initial statement of the rules regulating non-Muslims living in the Muslim polity. This initial statement was supplemented by later developed rules, whose legitimacy relied on an ethos of Islamic universalism, even as the Islamic empire gave way to multiple polities of regional and local power. A universalist ethos, and the memory of imperial conquest, offered a normative framework to render the dhimmí rules meaningful and legitimate. That framework was, arguably, a lens through which Muslim
scholars such as al-Baqillani understood and ordered their world. Conquest initially presented itself as an economic and political phenomenon, but soon became part of a collective memory that informed the way Muslim scholars understood their past and its implications with regard to the aims, purposes and aspirations of governance and law.

As part of the historical memory of a community, the conquest period became aspirational, especially as later centuries witnessed the demise of the Islamic empire into fractionalised polities. As the contemporary historian of Islam Marshall Hodgson states, the period of the early caliphs 'tends to be seen through the image formed of it in the Middle Periods; those elements of its culture are regarded as normative that were warranted sound by later writers' 29. For Hodgson, in the Middle Period (roughly the mid-tenth century to 1500), the challenges of 'political legitimation, of aesthetic creativity, of transcendence and immanence in religious understanding, of the social role of natural sciences and philosophy – these become fully focused only in the Middle Periods', 30 in part by nostalgic reference to an imperial past. The memory of a glorious, righteous imperial past offered a lens for Muslim jurists to understand how a Muslim polity should regulate interactions with non-Muslims, given the fact of diversity, and despite imperial fragmentation.

Consequently, when al-Baqillani remarked about the goodness of the believer beating the non-believer, and the evil of the non-believer beating the believer, we cannot ignore the fact that his substantive valuation was dependent upon a particular vision of the Islamic past, which informed certain aspects of his present. The horizon of the past and his present were fused to create a norm that depended, for its very intelligibility, upon the ethics of universalism, imperialism and the subordination of the other.

5. Legitimating gender differentiation

Heeding the distinction between justice as equality, and justice as the good and the bad, though, is not meant to suggest that this study prefers the philosopher's justice over the jurist's. Rather, the philosophical principle of equality provides a vantage point from which we can appreciate the underlying (and often unstated) assumptions that make legal determinations not only possible, but intelligible. By distinguishing between the fact of difference and the normative implications of that factual difference, we can better identify the assumptions that allow jurists to justify differentiation as a matter of law, and thereby appreciate the scope of critique required to render those assumptions as inherently discriminatory.

This brings us to the issue of gender difference, and global calls for equality in Muslim family law. The existing literature on gender discrimination, in both Islamic legal doctrine and Muslim-majority state family law regimes, is vast and need not be reviewed here. 31 Indeed, other contributions to this volume outline the doctrines that pose difficulties to gender equality advocates. For the purpose of understanding the doctrines in terms of the paradox of equality, of central interest is the rationale used to justify discriminatory treatment between men and women under Islamic law. This rationale uses the fact of gender difference to justify differentiation.

For instance, Murtaza Mutahhari (d. 1979), a student of Ayatollah Khomeini, argued that legal gender differentiation reflects the very conditions of justice that are captured in the paradox of equality. He took aim at critics who held that gender differentiation in matters of divorce and inheritance law is 'contemptuous of, and insulting to, the female sex' – or, in other words, discriminatory. 32 Instead, he implicitly acknowledged that the justification of gender differentiation accounts for the considerations that lie at the heart of the paradox of equality:

[W]oman and man, on the basis of the very fact that one is a woman and the other is a man, are not identical with each other in many respects. The world is not exactly alike for both of them, and their natures and dispositions were not intended to be the same. Eventually, this requires that in very many rights, duties, and punishments they should not have an identical placing. 33

For him, the undeniable naturalness of the fact of biological difference was suitably significant to justify legal differentiation between men and women.

In other cases, the fact of gender difference is deemed significant by recasting the difference as shorthand for complex social dynamics that require differentiation. For instance, the Qur'an asserts that a son will inherit twice the amount of his sister(s). 34 The verse itself does not explain the rationale behind the discriminatory distribution. Pre-modern Muslim jurists identified this verse as representing a departure from pre-Islamic practices, which often denied daughters any inheritance share. 35 Contemporary writers explain and justify the verse's distribution by reading the fact of gender difference as an efficient way to capture the heart of the matter – socio-economic factors concerning the distribution of economic responsibility for the family. Acknowledging the change from pre-Islamic practice, they recognise that personal status laws, such as inheritance rules,

were formulated to meet a woman's needs in a society where her largely domestic, childbearing roles rendered her sheltered and dependent upon her father, her husband, and her close male relations ... Because men had more independence, wider social contacts, and higher status in the world, their social position was translated into greater legal responsibilities ... as well as more extensive legal privileges in proportion to those responsibilities. 36
In the case of inheritance rules, the fact of gender difference in the Qur’an is made to encompass a historically contingent social hierarchy. That economic and social hierarchy is read into the original Qur’anic verse, which makes no reference to such social conditions. The verse only references the fact of gender difference. The legitimacy of the verse’s inheritance rule, therefore, is explained after the fact, and is intelligible once we appreciate the paradox of equality as a feature of justice. But attention to the paradox of equality also illuminates the poverty of the after-the-fact justification to account for changed historical contexts. Despite changes in lived economic realities, and calls to reform Islamic family law, such as the laws of inheritance, little change has been forthcoming.

6. Post-coloniality and the paradox of equality

The failure of reformist attempts is not simply a function of the power of the Qur’anic or other source-text to subvert the claims of history. Rather, the imperatives of a post-colonial history more often than not subvert the demands of changing socio-economic conditions, and thereby undermine calls for reform in Islamic family law. Gender-based legal reform is not a new issue, whether one looks to the Muslim world or elsewhere. Gender difference, as a site of legal debate, has been, and continues to be, an ongoing issue of contention in countries spanning the globe. As such, the Muslim world is hardly unique in being a site of gender-equality debates. Rather, what makes the Muslim world appear unique and distinct is the historical moment in which demands for gender-based reform are made: a post-colonial context of newly independent Muslim states embedded in informal modes of hegemony exercised by the global North over the South. In the twentieth century, the elites of these relatively newly minted Muslim states participated in the international scene, but did not (and presumably could not) go so far as to ignore the traditional modes of identity that animated segments of their domestic society. The traditional models of identity, arguably, gave content to the national identity and political authenticity of new Muslim-majority states, in an international arena beset by pre-existing and ongoing asymmetries of power. In this context, calls for gender reform inflamed (and still do) conservative segments in Muslim polities that viewed claims for gender equality as yet another colonial imposition, or as premature given the fragile state of the nation. Ann McClintock, writing about the importance of viewing nationalism in gendered terms, notes that
gender difference between women and men serves to symbolically define the limits of national difference and power between men. Excluded from direct action as national citizens, women are subsumed symbolically into the national body politic as its boundary and metaphoric limit... Women are typically construed as the symbolic bearers of the nation, but are denied any direct relation to national agency. The nationality of a new state could not avoid being framed, in a post-colonial setting, by the asymmetry between it and its former colonial powers. In these contexts, women contributed to the notion of nationhood, but only passively so. Women were made to represent the nation’s ideals, but had no power to determine the content of those ideals. Those ideals drew upon a historical tradition whose continuity had as much to do with the post-colonial condition as with religious adherence.

Attentiveness to the post-colonial context reminds us that, since the twentieth century, the debates on gender reform have been embedded in a larger context about post-colonial identity formation, in which the content of national authenticity was defined (and often still is) in religious doctrinal terms. Furthermore, the burden of that content has been placed squarely on the shoulders of those who, more often than not, have had too little power to assert their voice. These political circumstances allow us to appreciate why the factual difference between men and women may seem significant enough to justify legal differentiation in the Muslim world today. To recast that differentiation as discrimination, therefore, requires more than arguments over competing Qur’anic verses, hadith texts or methodologies of interpretation.

7. (En)countering difference: social movements and the rereading of equality

Those who read this chapter may be disappointed with the absence of any slam-dunk legal argument for gender equality in Islamic law. But such disappointment is premised on unfair expectations of what is possible within the law. Yes, it is true that there are possible readings of Qur’anic verses that can lead to a principle of gender equality. Yes, certain hadith texts that justify gender-based discrimination can be challenged as lacking sufficient authenticity to justify the rule for which they are invoked. And, yes, some scholars recognise the need to offer a more general theory of gender relations in Islam to animate new interpretations of Islamic law. Looking for solace in technical legal arguments is quite reasonable, and, most importantly, quite efficient. It allows the proponent of gender equality to make an argument on the assumption that the reader is a reasonable one, open to new readings of the Islamic legal sources, and thereby willing and able to change his or her mind.

However, the dilemma is that changing minds on what might seem to be a minor, technical, legal issue actually involves significant reformulations of socially and culturally embedded ideas about the right and the wrong, the good and the bad – all of which transcend the merely legal. For instance, reasonable arguments can be made to justify the equal treatment of men and women under Islamic inheritance rules. Those arguments can be, and are, based on historical changes in
the economic reality of men and women, and the increasing need for families to have multiple wage earners to ensure adequate financial well-being. But to make a modification to that particular legal rule has implications not only on estate distribution upon death, but on the social and cultural imagination of the nature of the workplace and the well-being of the family. Indeed, any modification to a specific legal rule may bring with it considerable socio-cultural concerns that exist outside the province of the law, but are no less relevant to consider.

As such, we cannot exclude the importance of harnessing extra-legal factors in the pursuit of gender equality in Islamic law. The role of social movements is particularly crucial in affecting the way in which judges and jurists engage in the ongoing enterprise of legal interpretation. For instance, Professor Riva Siegel of Yale Law School has written about the Equal Rights Amendment in the United States, which sought to ensure gender equality as a constitutional principle. That amendment was never formally passed, pursuant to the procedures outlined in Article V of the US Constitution. But, as Siegel shows, the failure to amend the Constitution does not mean the social movement failed to change US constitutional law concerning gender equality. Rather, she adopts a different view of legal development, which recognises that judges interpret the Constitution 'in the midst of a popular debate about the Constitution'. She further elaborates:

Americans on both sides of the courthouse door are making claims about the Constitution. Outside the courthouse, the Constitution’s text plays a significant role in eliciting and focusing normative disputes among Americans about women’s rights under the Constitution – a dynamic that serves to communicate these newly crystallizing understandings and expectations about women’s rights to judges interpreting the Constitution inside the courthouse door. Such communication occurs whether or not the activities in question satisfy Article V ... for constitutional lawmaking.

For Siegel, the meaning of the Constitution can change as long our appreciation of judicial interpretation recognises the agency of the jurist who interprets the law in light of ongoing contests about its meaning. Consequently, whether or not social mobilisations lead to formal legal change, such movements affect the climate within which judges appreciate the nature of the legal conflict before them. In a context of social movements around legal change, participants make claims about the law’s meaning. Sometimes such mobilisations result in constitutional amendments; most often they do not. But even when no formal act of law making occurs, constitutional contestation nonetheless plays an important role in transforming understandings about the Constitution’s meaning inside and outside the courts. Importantly, Siegel is writing about the judicial process, and not the legislative one. Her theory of legal change assumes a constitutional legal order, and a sufficiently democratic political order that permits expressions of dissent openly and publicly.

Those politico-legal characteristics do not necessarily obtain in the Muslim world. Nonetheless, her thesis about social movements is important, if only to illustrate the scope of intervention required for effective legal reform.

If we accept the relationship between social movements and legal change, then we cannot ignore the effect of gender-equality social movements on the possibility of legal change in the Muslim world. For instance, Amina Wadud writes about waging a gender jihad, and offers numerous stories from ‘the trenches’. More often than not, the stories show that the effort to make changes on the ground have led to limited, if any, success in legislative reform or changes to mosque culture around the world. Nonetheless, her personal dedication to the cause of gender equality has resulted in considerable public engagement with the status and role of women in Islam generally, and the Muslim world specifically. Sisters in Islam, a Malaysian civil society organisation committed to gender equality, has been at the forefront of challenging the patriarchal tradition still affecting Muslim women in Malaysia. While Sisters in Islam has made serious gains in the domestic Malaysian sphere, those gains have not come without cost. In 2005, Sisters in Islam published the book Muslim Women and the Challenges of Islamic Extremism, edited by Norani Othman, a professor at the National University of Malaysia. In July 2008, Malaysia’s Ministry of Home Affairs banned the book, claiming that it undermined public order. Sisters in Islam petitioned a court for judicial review of the ministerial order, and the presiding judge reversed the ban. The book illustrates the challenges facing social movements that operate within a political climate that is less than open. In fact, the ban is a reminder that the effectiveness of social movements (and thereby the possibility of legal reform) is directly connected to the openness of a society. Nonetheless, the success in overturning the ban illustrates the power of social movements to change the discursive context in societies that may not be as open as most would prefer. The Malaysian example shows that, in less than fully open societies, social movements have the potential to expand the scope of legal arguments that are intelligible, meaningful and possible.

8. Conclusion

The beginning of this chapter paid tribute to the many voices that have come before to advocate for gender equality in Islamic family law. Those voices, while differing from each other in method, approach and aim, nonetheless speak in unison about the need to reflect on the ongoing existence of gender discrimination in the Muslim world. For some, that reflection requires an analysis of pre-modern source-texts and their authenticity. For others, it requires unpacking the Qur’anic and legal discourses of the patriarchal attitudes that have, for so long, animated them. And yet others would suggest that there is no chance of reforming Islamic law, and that, instead, recourse must be made to a tradition of human rights,
whose content is informed by contemporary treaties, such as CEDAW. All of these approaches have their merits, and all can be criticised; but, in the aggregate, they constitute the voices of a social movement advocating for change. In some cases that change will come by reference to human rights standards. In others, it will come by reference to new, authoritative interpretations of source-texts within the Islamic legal tradition. And yet other cases will require a blending of international law, domestic constitutional law and aspects of Islamic law. This fusion will create a legal outcome which reflects the legal pluralism that has become so characteristic of the modern state in an increasingly globalised world.

The strategies may differ, and the outcomes will be inspired by different animating impulses, but in all cases the effectiveness of any particular strategy requires acknowledgement that the paradox of equality operates in the background and may limit the effectiveness of those advocating for gender equality in the Muslim world. Attentiveness to the paradox of equality will beg important questions about what factual differences are legally relevant and why. The paradox of equality reminds us that, while differently situated people should be treated differently to satisfy the demands of justice, what constitutes a legally relevant factual difference is often a naturalised construct that is waiting to be denaturalised and deconstructed. But, as gender activists around the world already know, the threat of such deconstruction has the potential to create considerable instability, whether politically, socially, culturally or legally. This does not mean that gender equality is not possible in the Muslim world. Rather, it suggests that we do not exist in a vacuum or make normative claims from a position ex nihilo. Our claims about and for justice are necessarily embedded in a set of predispositions from which it is difficult to escape. These predispositions influence how we decide which factual differences are appropriate for legal differentiation, and that is not. To view the idea of equality from the perspective of the paradox of equality helps to illuminate the scale and scope of any intervention that seeks to undo and reverse a legal differentiation, on the grounds that it is discriminatory.

Notes

1 The author wishes to thank Zainah Anwar, Lynn Welchman and the editors for their encouragement and support of this research. My colleague, Sophia Reibetanz-Moreau, was generous with advice and insight on contemporary philosophical debates on equality. Special thanks go to my friend and colleague, Robert Gibbs (University of Toronto) for our engaging debate and discussion on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Although he may not realise it, Akhil Amar of Yale Law School deserves special thanks for introducing me to the diversity of scholarship on constitutional interpretation in the United States. Rumee Ahmed and Ayesha Chaudhry read an earlier draft of this chapter and helped make it better. My very able research assistant, Kate Southwell, provided helpful copy-editing and improved the readability of the chapter. Lastly, I thank the Oslo Coalition for its hospitality in early January 2010 in Cairo, Egypt, where I had an opportunity to share some of the ideas that are presented herein at a workshop featuring other authors in this volume.


4 While examples in lieu of the loo might be less crude, the example of the bathroom offers an important arena for exploring fundamental concerns about equality. See, for instance, Molotch, Harvey, ‘The rest room and equal opportunity’, Sociological Forum 3/1 (1998), pp. 128–32.


8 The banality of this example is also rendered complicated when considering how the neat dichotomy between male and female bathrooms does not account for the transgendered, or those in varying phases of gender-reassignment.

9 McHale v Watson (1966), 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC); see also Moran, Mayo, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) for a discussion of this case and others addressing the reasonable person standard of care.

10 Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite, p. ix.


40 Ibid., p. 3.
44 Qur’an, 4:11.
47 Indeed, Angheie, Antony, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), argues that international law continues to perpetuate the dynamic of colonialism and asymmetries of power between the global North and South.
49 See the works of Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas and Fatima Mernissi, all of which are cited in this chapter.
50 See, for instance, Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name.

52 For a recent contribution to the study of women’s social movements and the significance of hybridity, see Goss, Kristin A. and Michael T. Heaney, ‘Organizing women as women: hybridity and grassroots collective action in the 21st century’, Perspectives on Politics 8/1 (March 2010), pp. 27–52.


54 Ibid., p. 314.

55 Siegel, 'Text in contest', p. 303.


57 Gooch, Liz, 'Ban on book is overturned by court in Malaysia; government had said the publication might confuse Muslim women', International Herald Tribune, 26 January 2010, p. 3.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir is founder of the Fahmina Foundation, an Indonesian NGO working on gender and democracy for Muslim communities. He is lecturer on the hadiths of legal injunctions (ahkâm) in the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Syekh Nurjati and the Fahmina Institute for Islamic Studies (ISIF) Cirebon-Indonesia, and a student of the PhD programme in the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS) at Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta. He is the author of Hadith and Gender Justice: Understanding the Prophetic Traditions (2007).

Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd (1943–2010) was a leading scholar and intellectual engaging with the hermeneutics of the Qur’an from a liberal Islamic perspective informed by the modern humanities. After obtaining his PhD in Arabic and Islamic Studies in 1981, he joined the Department of Arabic at Cairo University, and spent 1985–89 as a visiting professor at Osaka University. His writings provoked religious controversy over his elevation to full professor. In 1995, the Cairo Appeals Court declared him an apostate and dissolved his marriage. Abu-Zayd and his wife went into exile in Europe, their lives at risk from radicals. After 1995, Abu-Zayd taught as a professor of Islamic studies at Leiden University, served as the Ibn Rushd Chair at the University for Humanistics in Utrecht, and held a fellowship at the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin. His voluminous publications include three books in English, Voice of an Exile: Reflections on Islam (with Esther R. Nelson, 2004), Rethinking the Qur’an: Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics (2004), and Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis (2006).

Zainah Anwar is a founding member of Sisters in Islam (SIS) and is currently the Director of Musawah, the global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family. She is at the forefront of the women’s movement pushing for an end to the