Friday, February 9, 2018 - 9:30am to 3:00pm
In FA2 - Solarium - Falconer Hall

Law enforcement and national security agencies in many different states argue that strong encryption in making the internet “go dark” and that they need ways to bypass this encryption in order to investigate crime and prevent terrorism attacks. Proposals to bypass the effects of encryption often include mandating the creation of “back doors” such as through different ways of managing access to types of “master keys” but can also include compelled disclosure of passwords or keys from suspects (raising concerns regarding the right against self-incrimination). Often such proposals are short on details, such as Public Safety Canada’s recent discussion as part of its 2016 National Security consultation. The tech industry, security experts, and civil liberties groups have largely responded that encryption bypasses pose too great a danger to cybersecurity and fundamental rights.

This workshop brings together multiple perspectives to map the terrain of this debate.



Welcome and Introduction

9:45 - 10:45

Mapping the Debate: Ed Felten (Princeton)




Policy Panel Discussion

Chair: Ron Diebert (University of Toronto, Citizen Lab)


  • Lex Gill (Citizen Lab)
  • Micheal Vonn (BCCLA)
  • Hamish Stewart (University of Toronto)


Lunch (a light lunch will be provided)


Technology Panel Discussion 

Chair: Lisa Austin (University of Toronto)


  • Ross Anderson (Cambridge)
  • Yan Zhu (Brave/EFF)
  • Ian Goldberg (Waterloo)


This event is free but registration is required: click here to register.

For more information, contact: