CITIZENSHIP AND PENAL LAW

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The concept of citizenship can play a useful, though not necessarily a central, role in a descriptive account of penal practice. By contrast, it contributes nothing to a normative theory of criminal law, being either empty, as a proxy for personhood, or pernicious, as a proxy for insiderhood.

As a matter of positive law, citizenship is largely, if not entirely, irrelevant in all aspects of penal law—from substantive criminal law, which deals with the definition of criminal offenses and the ascription of criminal liability, to procedural criminal law, which is concerned with the imposition of the norms of substantive criminal law, and finally, the law of punishment execution, which governs the infliction of sanctions attached to the violation of norms of substantive criminal law. Offenses are not defined in terms of the citizenship status of either the offender or the victim. Defenses do not take into account the citizenship of the offender or the victim. Prescribed punishments have no regard to the citizenship of the offender or the victim. Penal procedural rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens.¹ And citizens serve prison sentences alongside...

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¹. That is not to say that attempts have not been made to employ the distinction in a procedural context, most recently and notoriously by the Bush Administration in its “war

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noncitizens, pay the same fines as noncitizens, and are subject to the same probation and parole conditions as noncitizens.

There are some very few offenses that, by definition, apply only to citizens or noncitizens. For instance, only noncitizens can commit immigration offenses (as principals), and only citizens (or nationals) can commit crimes of state disloyalty, most importantly treason. Also, noncitizens are subject to different sanctions than citizens: they can be deported, i.e., stripped of the privilege to reside in the country of conviction. Let’s assume these sanctions qualify as punishment in fact, if not in form; still, it’s noteworthy that, formally, they are classified as administrative sanctions based on the sovereign’s unlimited discretionary power to control entry into its territory or, to put it less spatially, to “define its political community.” Citizens may (no longer) be denaturalized (or expatriated) as punishment. At the same time, (only) citizens, again by definition, can be denied the “privileges and immunities” of citizenship, as for instance in the temporary or permanent disenfranchisement of those convicted of felonies or “infamous crimes” (with felony historically being the original infamous crime: breach of the duty of fealty). Jurisdiction, in Anglo-American criminal law, is based on the territoriality principle, i.e., on the locus criminis, rather than on the offender’s or the victim’s citizenship on terror.” These attempts were roundly and repeatedly dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); see Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 Geo. L.J. 1497 (2007). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures does not cover extraterritorial searches of aliens).


4. On the distinction between suffrage as privilege and as right, see Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion 58 (1991). The phrase “privileges and immunities” is taken from the Comity Clause in Article 4 of the U.S. Constitution (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); the phrase “privileges or immunities” appears in the Fourteenth Amendment (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”) The distinction between right and privilege in U.S. constitutional history remains largely unexplored. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193, 1220–22 (1992).
(or for that matter on the country or county of residency, visa status or duration, length of stay, or nationality). The citizenship (or nationality) of either the offender or the victim may in some exceptional cases establish what is known, tellingly, as “extraterritorial” jurisdiction (or venue, within a given jurisdiction).\(^5\)

If one shifts focus from the offender and the victim to those who define and impose norms, and inflict sanctions for their infringement, citizenship does come squarely into view: state officials in all three branches of government must be citizens: legislators, judges, jurors (but not witnesses), bailiffs, prosecutors, public (but not private) defense attorneys, police officers, probation officers, prison guards, governors, and yes, presidents (who hold the pardon power). As the U.S. Supreme Court held, in rejecting an equal protection challenge against a California law requiring that all “peace officers” (a huge category, including, in this case, probation officers) be citizens, “a state may limit the exercise of the sovereign’s coercive police powers over members of the community to citizens.”\(^6\) Peace officers, according to the Court, “personify the state’s sovereign powers” because they “symbolize the political community’s control over . . . those who have been found to have violated the norms of social order.”\(^7\) More generally, the Court remarked that “the exclusion of aliens” is “a necessary consequence of the community’s process of political self-definition,” for the simple reason that “[a]liens are by definition those outside of this community.”\(^8\)

As a matter of positive law, then, citizenship, even if understood broadly as membership in “the political community,” is a prerequisite only for those who “personify the state’s sovereign power” in all aspects of the penal process, and not for offenders or their victims. This conception of penal- ity may be open to criticism insofar as it relies on a fundamental distinction

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5. On various theories of criminal jurisdiction in American criminal law, see generally Markus D. Dubber & Mark Kelman, American Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes, and Comments, ch. 2 (2nd ed., 2009). The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, which attempted to consolidate the fractured and haphazard treatment of federal criminal jurisdiction, recognized extraterritorial jurisdiction only in cases of treason, offenses committed by a federal official, or in cases that were “outside the jurisdiction of any nation” and either the offender or the victim were U.S. nationals. Proposed New Federal Criminal Code §§ 201, 208.
7. Id. at 447.
8. Id. at 440.
between, on the one hand, the subjects and objects of state power and, on
the other, penal power in particular, which is inconsistent with the prin-
ciple of autonomy, i.e., the very principle of “self-government” that it claims
to manifest.9 But that criticism cannot be framed in terms of citizenship,
for it is the concept of citizenship that is used to draw the contested dis-
tinction in the first place.

I.

As has been pointed out many times before, citizenship here, as elsewhere,
both identifies and differentiates. It defines the identity of insiders in dis-
tinction from the identity, or identities, of outsiders (who can either form
a distinct political community or exist merely as stateless individuals, out-
laws, and so on—think of the distinction between regular troops and par-
tisans, for example). The community of citizenship, it is generally implied
rather than made explicit, is distinctive in that it is subject to the prin-
ciple of self-government.10 Within the political community thus defined, all
insiders enjoy the same “privileges and immunities” of citizenship (unless
and until they are suspended, temporarily or permanently, as for instance,
in the case of the disenfranchisement of those who committed felonia).11
Self-government, then, is self-government of citizens, by citizens, for citi-
zens. Aliens may or may not belong to another political community that
may or may not adhere to the principle of self-government; that is, they
may or may not be citizens elsewhere. Their alien citizenship potential,
however, is beside the point. The alien is, simply, “not a citizen.”12

The definition of citizenship by distinction is nothing new. The citizen
in ancient Greece or Rome was defined in contrast to other residents who
were incapable of self-government as well as to nonresidents who, as
Barbarians, were likewise not only different, but distinctly inferior in the
relevant sense—incapable of self-government, they were only capable of

9. Id. at 439.
10. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 166 (1875) (“citizen,” rather than “sub-
ject” or “inhabitant,” “has been considered better suited to the description of one living
under a republican government”).
11. On felonia as the Ur offense, see below.
12. 40 U.S.C. § 841(r): “Alien’ means any person who is not a citizen or national of
the United States.”
being objects of other-government, of being governed rather than governing. 
Foreigners thus were the nonresidential analogue to residential household 
members, as the objects of the only proper subjects of government, the 
citizens, who could govern themselves as well as others less capable. 

Contemporary accounts of citizenship similarly assume the citizen’s 
capacity for self-government, without necessarily denying that capacity to 
aliens (who may be citizens in their political communities) or tying self-
government in the public sphere to other-government in the private 
sphere (of the household, or the family). All citizens, with the exception 
of young children, adults with certain mental defects, and those convicted 
of “infamous crimes,” are said to possess the requisite capacity for self-
government and therefore for participation in the public sphere and 
membership in the “political community.” The poor, women, and racial 
minorities are no longer denied de jure the right to vote, for instance, be-
cause they lack the requisite capacity for self-government. 

Still, it is worth noting that the poor, women, and racial minorities were 
not necessarily denied citizenship; they were simply denied one of the “priv-
ileges and immunities” of citizenship. In other words, citizenship is not nec-
essarily a unitary or equal status. (Consider, for instance, the common 
distinction between “native-born” and “naturalized” citizens, not to mention 
that between citizens and “permanent residents.”)13 All citizens are alike in 
that they are not aliens, but they are not necessarily alike in other respects. 
“Second-class citizens,” for instance, enjoy a status that is distinct from, and 
in principle superior to, a (resident or nonresident) alien, but they may lack 
certain civil rights enjoyed by other citizens. There is, in other words, a dif-
ference between “citizenship” and “rights of citizenship,” so that one may lose 
the latter while retaining the former.14 Put another way, one has an uncondi-
tional right to retain one’s citizenship15 but not to retain the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship.16 Of course, the conferral of the status of citizen

13. The significance of the former distinction is exemplified by Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
whose case has inspired calls to amend the U.S. Constitution to drop the requirement that 
the president be a native-born citizen. The latter distinction, between citizens and “per-
manent residents,” i.e., one type of “resident alien,” has attracted attention in the Bush 
Administration’s “war on terror.”
in rebellion, or other crime, as justification for disenfranchisement).
through naturalization is itself a privilege; only the native-born citizen has a right to the status (either through *ius sanguinis* or *ius soli*).

It is not helpful, at least for a normative theory, to rely on a definition of citizen as a nonalien, where the alien is defined as a noncitizen. One might, of course, develop richer accounts of alienship—the other, the enemy, and so on (Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben come to mind, among many others, including Günther Jakobs, whose theory of enemy criminal law will be discussed in some detail below)—which may have some explanatory power, at least as sociological models. Without a theory of the other and perhaps of the necessary/permanent/essential struggle of the self with the other, or the friend with the foe, one would expect a rich account of the nature of citizenship. For instance, one might expect a normative theory of the connection between citizenship and self-government, a theory that captures the positive, affirmative side of citizenship rather than its negative, differentiating, and exclusionary aspect of nonalienship. Put another way, what is it about citizenship that establishes its “liberal” credentials, its (necessary? definitional?) connection to equality, liberty, and democracy?

The answer is, I think, personhood. Citizenship implies self-government insofar as, and only insofar as, citizenship implies personhood, where personhood in turn is defined as the capacity for autonomy. But if it is the citizen’s personhood that renders him capable of self-government and, therefore, entitled to self-government, then the concept of citizenship contributes nothing (valuable) to the account. It is true, historically, that citizenship has been associated with self-government. But that association was consistent with the prolonged denial of the right to self-government (either through a denial of citizenship or of its attendant privileges and immunities) to a great many persons whom we now, since the Enlightenment, regard as possessing the requisite capacity. Citizenship, in other words, is not a liberal concept; personhood is. The household member, the poor, the woman, the felon, the African American, deserves full civil rights as a person, not as a citizen. Self-government today is a human (or person) right, not a civil (or citizen) right that may or may not be enjoyed by all persons.

17. In fact, the very case—cited above n. 10—that highlighted the intimate connection between citizenship and republican government denied women citizens the right to vote.
In this account, citizenship is no more than a label, though perhaps a convenient one, that marks the manifestation of the personal right of autonomy in the political sphere. As a member of a political community, and more precisely of one type of political community, a state, the person is a citizen, or more specifically a state citizen (Staatsbürger), much like she is a sister as a member of a family, or an executive vice president as a member of a corporation.  

Now, it may well be that one’s status as state citizen may—and perhaps even should—affect one’s rights and obligations in the realm of distributive justice (for instance, in the distribution of social services or one’s tax liability), but even there it is doubtful that citizenship status would be more than one among several relevant considerations (including residency, financial contribution, need, and so on). In the realm of penal justice, however, citizenship is of no significance. Neither as a matter of positive law nor as a matter of normative theory does the concept of citizenship play a role in an account of the nature of crime or of the penal process in general. A crime is not committed by a citizen, nor against a citizen. That it is defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by citizens doesn’t transform it from an interpersonal into an intercitizenal event, though it does reflect the fact that the “political community” takes an interest in the matter. The reason for the state’s interest, however, has nothing to do with its being a political community, except, arguably, in the very few cases of crimes against the state, i.e., treason and its cognates. It is no accident that in these cases, the offender’s citizenship is significant: only a citizen can commit treason, as only a citizen can breach his duty of loyalty to the sovereign. (Whether, or at least how, these loyalty offenses are legitimate in a person-based system of criminal law is another matter.)

If we leave treason aside for the moment, crime is an interpersonal event, not an intercitizenal one. Crime is a public wrong, and in that sense is of interest to the “political community” insofar as the offender and the victim are regarded as persons with whom those who sit in judgment identify as persons (via their sense of justice, or capacity for empathy). Moreover, on
this person-based account, crime is the manifestation of the offender’s personhood at the expense of the victim’s. The state, whose reason for being is the protection and manifestation of the persons who constitute it (“the political community,” if you like), becomes engaged in the face of crime insofar as it is necessary to protect and manifest the personhood of both the victim (against impunity) and the offender (against vengeance).

Personhood, then, is a prerequisite not only for the judge (including all public officials participating in all aspects of the penal process—legislative, judicial, and executive), but also for offender and victim. (Contrasted with citizenship, which is required only for the judge, but not for the objects of her judgment). Crime is committed by a person, as such, against a person, as such, and judged by a person, as such. Punishment is the reaffirmation of the victim’s personhood in the face of the offender’s denial. Of course, one could simply substitute “citizenship” for “personhood” and “citizen” for “person,” but nothing would be gained as a result, or rather nothing that adds to the normative account of the penal process. Reframing the account in terms of citizenship instead adds the differentiating, exclusionary, and demeaning aspect of the concept of citizenship traced back to its decidedly preliberal roots in the oppressive dual state of “republican” Athens and Rome, both of which tied autonomy in the public sphere to heteronomy in the private sphere (the household, *oikos*; the family, *familia*).

If we turn to positive law, we find that crimes are defined in terms of personhood, either explicitly in specific offense definitions or implicitly in general principles of criminal liability, so that “whoever” refers to a person with the capacity for autonomy that can manifest itself through an external intentional act. Those who lack that capacity, such as young children and certain individuals who suffer from a mental disease or defect, are incapable of criminal liability in all cases; others, who are unable to exercise that capacity in a particular case, are excused from criminal liability in that case (e.g., duress, provocation, entrapment, superior orders).

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20. On the split personality of American political thought and practice, which affirmed citizenship for some in explicit contradistinction from the noncitizenship of others, see Shklar, supra n. 4.
22. Another way of capturing this distinction is by differentiating between incapacity and inability excuses—see Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code (2002)—or between categorical and particularized excuses. The use of the concept of “exemption”
Again with the exception of offenses of state disloyalty, offenses are not
defined in terms of citizenship. The criminal law is not “a law for citizens
and for visitors to the polity” 23 but, like all law, a law for persons. Public
wrongs are not “those that should concern all citizens, as wrongs, simply
in virtue of their shared citizenship with the offender and with the vic-
tim” 24; what matters is the shared personhood of judge, offender, and vic-
tim. Defenses also do not consider the citizen status of offender, victim, or
third parties. In self-defense, it makes no difference whether the self-
defender or the unlawful attacker is a citizen of some political community,
or of the same political community. An attack is no more or less unlawful
because it was undertaken by a noncitizen, no matter which definition of
unlawfulness one adopts. Other-defense is no more or less justifiable be-
because the third-party object of the unlawful attack was a noncitizen. In
fact, American criminal law once limited other-defense not to fellow citi-
zens, or members of the same polity, but to household members. 25 Even
that limitation, however, has since been abandoned in favor of a rule that
draws no distinction among those whom I am justified in defending
against an unlawful attack; the defense of others now is an empathic form
of self-defense (“use of force for the protection of other persons” 26), applying
to any case in which I, placing myself in the position of the person at-
tacked, would be justified in using force necessary to protect my person. 27
Likewise, the defense of duress is not limited to threats against third parties
who are fellow citizens, either of the issuer or of the recipient of the threat.
Again, although American criminal law once limited third-party duress to
threats against family members, 28 that restriction has been abandoned in

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24. Id. at 141.
26. Model Penal Code § 3.05.
27. See also Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code) § 32(i).
28. See also Strafgesetzbuch § 35.
favor of a rule that applies the defense to threats against any person, pro-
vided the threat is sufficient to satisfy the core element of the defense, the
inability to resist the coercion, under some reasonable person standard.\textsuperscript{29}

It makes no difference, positively or normatively, whether a noncitizen
vicinizes another noncitizen, or a citizen victimizes a fellow citizen, or a
noncitizen a citizen, or a citizen a noncitizen because, once again, crimes
are not violations of citizenship (but of personhood). If citizenship mat-
tered, one would think that the criminal law would not, and should not,
concern itself with offenses against animals, who presumably are nonciti-
zens so that citizens could not recognize a shared citizenship with the vic-
tim. Yet, Antony Duff argues that a criminal law for citizens “should also
cover non-human beings with interests that merit the law’s protection: in
particular, criminal laws protecting animals against abuse or maltreatment
should be understood as protecting, not human interests, but the interests
of those animals themselves.”\textsuperscript{30} If citizenship is a prerequisite for criminal
victimhood, protecting animals as direct victims of crime would seem to
imply that they count as citizens, which would mean that they would
qualify for criminal offenderhood as well.

That is not to say that animals should qualify for criminal victimhood
(or offendorhood), but merely that the reason they do, or do not, count as
(direct) victims of crime has nothing to do with their citizenship. The cen-
tral question, instead, is whether they qualify for personhood, that is, whether
they possess the requisite bundle of capacities distinctive of personhood. I
suspect that they do not, with the possible and very narrow exception of cer-
tain primates.\textsuperscript{31} The central question is whether putative persons are capable
of self-government, in the abstract sense of having the capacity—the tools—
for self-government, rather than the ability to exercise that capacity—to use
the tools—in a particular instance. (The latter interpretation would banish
individuals under the control of others—traditionally, the poor, women,
minorities—from personhood and from full and effective citizenship.)

\textsuperscript{29} Perkins, supra n. 25, at 1061–62; Model Penal Code § 2.09(1) (“use of, or a threat
to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another”).
\textsuperscript{30} Duff, supra n. 23, at 124.
\textsuperscript{31} Others disagree. See, e.g., Luis Chiesa, Why Is It a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?
Harm, Victimhood and the Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses, 78 Mississippi L.J. 1
tion for “stomping” on a goldfish, based on a statute proscribing killing “a companion an-
imal with aggravated cruelty”).
Citizenship appears, as a matter of positive law, to be no more of a prerequisite for offenderhood than for victimhood. The “defenses” of infancy and insanity bar the ascription of criminal liability to individuals on the ground, not that they lack citizenship, but that they lack the requisite capacity for responsibility (autonomy) because of age, “mental disease or defect,” or some other reason (as in the case of extreme intoxication) (covered, in German criminal law, by the general term Unzurechnungsfähigkeit). Of course, one might suggest that these individuals do not qualify for citizenship in the first place (contrary to positive law), so that their ineligibility for offenderhood is no surprise. But in that event it would appear that they also would be ineligible for victimhood, which would not only conflict with positive law but also presumably would be considered undesirable by proponents of a citizen-based criminal law.

II.

Those who recently have proposed to regard criminal law through the lens of citizenship have focused on, or have found it necessary to address, a timely question: what ought to be the classification and treatment of terrorists or, more simply and pointedly, of the terrorist Osama bin Laden.\(^32\)

As an initial matter, it should be noted that the meaning of “terrorist” in the literature on citizen criminal law remains somewhat unclear. Perhaps, insofar as this literature is concerned with criminal law, the terrorist in question could be described as someone convicted of—though, more accurately, as someone suspected of, or perhaps prosecuted for—having engaged in acts that satisfy some definition of the crime of terrorism, the elements of which, however, are rarely if ever specified, presumably because they are not central to the analysis. The “terrorist” at issue, therefore, might be more appropriately described as a particular type of individual, rather than as someone who is—suspected of, prosecuted for, or—convicted of a particular act that falls under the definition of a particular crime.\(^33\)


\(^33\) Günther Jakobs makes this explicit, defining “terrorist” as “someone who denies the legitimacy of the legal order in principle and therefore is set on its destruction.” Günther Jakobs, Bürgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht, 5 HRRStrafrecht 88, 92 (2004).
Let us see, then, what difference citizenship makes in the classification of “terrorists.” Corey Brettschneider, for instance, has argued that “the theoretical punishment of terrorist Osama bin Laden” illustrates “why the punishment that criminals deserve qua persons is distinct from the punishment that is justifiable to them qua citizens.” Punishing bin Laden qua person would mean “brutal, spontaneous, even bizarre retribution, perhaps at the hands of the victims of his attacks”; punishing him qua citizen would require “a fair trial for his crimes.” In Günther Jakobs’s account, the case of the terrorists behind the September 11 attacks provides a telling example of “enemy criminal law” (Feindstrafrecht), which treats its object as a source of danger, in contrast to “citizen criminal law” (Bürgerstrafrecht), which regards its object as a person. Antony Duff is less certain about how to classify terrorists; in his view, “it is not clear that we should treat terrorists as members of, or as visitors to, the political communities that they attack—rather than as enemies with whom we are engaged in a war.” At any rate, he cautions that they “still claim our respect as our fellow human beings. . . .”

The initial results are not encouraging. Brettschneider thinks the terrorist case illustrates the need for a citizenship-based theory of criminal law; Jakobs instead takes the case of terrorists to illustrate the need for a criminal law for noncitizens; and Duff concludes that citizen criminal law does not resolve the question of how to classify terrorists one way or the other. Perhaps these different positions reflect differences in conceptions of citizen criminal law. Certainly the fact that invoking the concept of citizenship cannot, by itself, generate a definitive answer to a question as difficult as the state’s, and in particular the criminal law’s, response to terrorist acts (or, rather, to terrorists) does not establish the uselessness of the concept.

Let us, then, take a closer look at each attempt to apply the concept of citizenship to the case of terrorism. Brettschneider’s analysis seems to turn significantly, if not primarily, on the citizenship of the judge, not on that of the offender (or of the victim). Drawing on a debate between two contestants in the 2004 U.S. presidential election, John Kerry and Howard Dean, Brettschneider uses the terrorist case to highlight the distinction between

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34. Brettschneider, supra n. 32, at 184.
35. Jakobs, supra n. 33.
36. Duff, supra n. 23, at 15.
37. Id.
the “private person’s” presumed urge to punish (exemplified by Kerry) and the “president of the United States” who has “to stand for the rule of law” (Dean). According to Brettschneider, the private “apolitical” person is concerned with meting out punishment as moral desert, whereas the citizen—the (public?) political person—is concerned with something else (something more?): justifying punishment to the offender. The concept of personal moral desert is limitless, informal, principleless (brutal, spontaneous, bizarre), whereas that of citizenal political desert is strictly constrained, formal, principled. This distinction is familiar from the literature on retributivism, which has long revolved around the question whether or not retributivism is vengeance rebranded, and even if it is, whether vengeance is unprincipled and unjustifiable. The urge to punish the terrorist, in fact, does not differ significantly from the urge to punish the reformed, now-harmless murderer, a case used by Michael Moore to argue for, not against, the justifiability of retributive punishment and of “rettributive emotions,” in particular.38 At any rate, the invocation of the concept of citizenship would add nothing to this debate, even if Brettschneider had set out in greater detail whose citizenship is at issue and, in particular, in what sense bin Laden qualified as a citizen.

The classification of the offender lies at the heart of Jakobs’s discussion of the terrorist case. His influential distinction between citizen criminal law and enemy criminal law, in fact, turns on the distinction between offenders as citizens and as enemies.39 To treat an offender as a citizen is to treat her as a person; to treat her as an enemy is to treat her as a danger source. The citizen is “a person who acts according to loyalty to law”40; to treat an offender as a person is to treat her as someone who “provides sufficient cognitive guarantee for conduct as a person.”41 Enemy criminal law is not necessarily illegitimate. The state may, and in fact must, treat certain offenders

39. The distinction has spawned a sizable literature both in Germany and in civil law countries where German criminal law theory retains considerable influence. See, e.g., Derecho penal del enemigo: El discurso penal de la exclusión, 2 vols. (Cancio Meliá & Gómez-Jara Díez, eds., Buenos Aires/Madrid: BdF/Edisofer, 2006); Diritto penale del nemico: Un dibattito internazionale (Massimo Donini & Michele Papa eds., Milan: Giuffrè 2007).
40. Jakobs, supra n. 33, at 91.
41. Id. at 94.
as enemies, i.e., as nonpersons, so as not to violate the “right to security” of persons.\footnote{Id. at 93.} Terrorists are prime examples of enemies because they lack not only the requisite loyalty to law but also the interest in acting according to it. (Jakobs does not consider the possibility of conflicting legal loyalties.)

Under Jakobs’s theory of citizen criminal law, then, the concept of citizenship makes all the difference in the terrorist case. In Jakobs’s view, the terrorist is the paradigmatic noncitizen; we need a concept of enemy criminal law precisely because the terrorist does not fit into the category of citizen criminal law.

Jakobs, in other words, reaches a conclusion diametrically opposed to Brettschneider’s. Brettschneider (apparently) views bin Laden as a citizen whose very citizenhood illustrates the need for a theory of citizen criminal law, rather than one of person criminal law, which could not legitimate punishing terrorists (or any other offender, for that matter). Citizen criminal law, to Brettschneider, highlights the identity of terrorists and other criminal offenders, all of whom have an “inalienable” right to have punishment justified to them as citizens. Jakobs, by contrast, uses the concept of citizen criminal law to illuminate the difference between (noncitizen) terrorists and other (citizen) offenders.

More interesting than the differences between Jakobs’s and Brettschneider’s position on the terrorist issue is the fundamental similarity in their approach. Although both say little about the concept of citizenship that motivates their account of citizen criminal law, their concept of citizenship turns more or less explicitly on the concept of personhood. Jakobs is very clear about the connection: he uses citizenship and personhood interchangeably. The citizen is simply the legal object regarded as a person. The enemy differs from the citizen in her lack of personhood. Enemy criminal law treats its object as a nonperson, a danger source. Invoking the concept of citizenship thus adds nothing to the analysis in terms of personhood.

Brettschneider, as we’ve seen, stresses the distinction between punishment qua person and punishment qua citizen. Yet at the same time he insists that he has in mind, following Rawls, “a moral ideal of citizenship that suggests a way of treating all persons subject to state control,”\footnote{Brettschneider, supra n. 32, at 197 n.27.} rather than “a legal ideal of citizenship defined by state claims about who is and
who is not a full member of society.”\textsuperscript{44} Although his account of personhood is intentionally underdeveloped (the “flesh-and-blood” person appears as “a value-neutral description of actual individuals”\textsuperscript{45}), it appears that his concept of the citizen is a moral ideal, rather than a legal category, precisely because it is rooted in the concept of the moral person. Rawls himself saw the central challenge of political theory as “[t]he way basic social institutions should be arranged if they are to conform to the freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons,” one of “the two basic model-conceptions of justice as fairness”\textsuperscript{46} designed “to single out the essential aspects of our conception of ourselves as moral persons and of our relation to society as free and equal citizens.”\textsuperscript{47}

In this sense, then, Brettschneider’s citizen criminal law is at bottom—like Jakobs’s, only less explicitly—person criminal law. That Brettschneider insists on bin Laden’s citizenship, while Jakobs regards him as the paradigmatic noncitizen, reflects different accounts of personhood. To Rawls, and therefore to Brettschneider, personhood requires two “moral powers,” the capacity for a sense of justice (or empathy) and the capacity for a conception of the good. The details of Rawls’s account of personhood are not important here, but it is not difficult to see its connection to the Enlightenment’s familiar (Kantian, Rousseauian) abstract concept of the person as an individual endowed with the capacity for autonomy, or self-government. Under this view, individuals have moral, not social, dignity as persons, not as citizens, and again as persons, they deserve respect among equal persons. To say, with Kant, that the criminal law is a categorical imperative is to say that criminal law is person law, that crime is an attack on personhood and punishment its reaffirmation. Hegel makes the same point when he treats crime as a matter of Abstract Right, the most fundamental and abstract realm of political life where individuals are considered as persons. In punishment, the personhood of both the offender and the victim is reasserted in the face of the offender’s (internally inconsistent, nonuniversalizable, conceptually unstable, self-contradictory) attempt to negate the victim’s personhood, which in the end amounts to

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 178.\textsuperscript{45} Id. at 178, 194.\textsuperscript{46} The other being the well-ordered society.\textsuperscript{47} John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. Phil. 515, 517, 520 (1980).}
negating himself qua person given the relevant identity, as persons, of offender and victim.

The abstractness, breadth, and generality, of this conception of personhood served a crucial critical purpose: to deny the relevance of traditional status distinctions that structured political life.48 Citizenship was among the social markers, and arguably the most important one, that did not survive Enlightenment critique. As Judith Shklar has pointed out, citizenship was central to the American political project precisely because it always remained a social characteristic, a key, and arguably the most important, indicator of social standing. To be a citizen always also meant not to be a noncitizen, which in the American context meant most importantly not to be a slave: “From the first [Americans] defined their standing as citizens very negatively, by distinguishing themselves from their inferiors, especially from slaves and occasionally from women.”49 Despite the rhetoric of equality that dominated the American Revolution at a time of wide disenfranchisement of slaves, women, and the poor, the connection between this conception of citizenship as social standing and the conception of citizenship “for members of a master-class who feel a real affinity for one another, and who can spend their time together discussing the great matters of policy,” which Shklar attributes to Aristotle, is plain:

Only very few citizens can be said to be fit for such activities, or for the perfect education that is the true end of politics. This is a highly exclusive definition, for ideally only men who have the material means and personal breeding for leisure can achieve such citizenship. Women and slaves exist exclusively to serve them domestically.50

Shklar, in her account of citizenship as social standing, recognizes three other accounts of citizenship, “citizenship as nationality,” “citizenship as active participation,” and “ideal republican citizenship,” which are not the focus of her inquiry and, with the possible exception of the first, also are less relevant for our purposes (though the positive, if not idealistic, connotations of the latter two may well help explain the attraction of a citizen-based account of

49. Shklar, supra n. 4, at 15.
50. Id. at 29.
criminal law to at least some of its proponents). Whereas Shklar investigates “the exclusion of native-born Americans from citizenship,” citizenship as nationality and citizenship as standing share the central feature of definition by exclusion and superiority. Citizenship confers social standing whether it is based on one’s distinction from the alien noncitizen or from the “native-born” noncitizen. In fact, as the classes of disenfranchised “native-born Americans” gradually disappeared, de jure if not de facto, the role of the concept of citizenship as the source of a social standing through a sense of superiority vis-à-vis the alien noncitizen has become more important. Today, as women, blacks, and the poor have the franchise, the paradigmatic noncitizen is no longer the slave (native-born or not), but the alien (notably the “illegal immigrant”).

Still, it is worth noting that the mere classification as citizen should not, at least in the United States, be confused with recognition as political equal. Citizenship, in other words, is not only consistent with, if not essentially connected with, inequality insofar as it presumes the distinction from the radically unequal, and inferior, noncitizen; citizenship considered by itself also has been consistent with inequality, as some holders of the elevated status of citizen have been more equal than others. The underlying idea here is that citizenship is a right in only one sense: certain individuals are entitled to citizenship by birth (based on *ius sanguinis* or *ius soli*). No one else has a right to citizenship. The bundle of rights associated with citizenship, often referred to somewhat loosely as “civil rights,” turn out not to be rights at all but “privileges and immunities.” These rights qua citizen must be distinguished from other rights, such as constitutional rights (based on the constitution), human rights (based on one’s status as a human), or natural rights (possessed independently of state recognition or conferral). For our purposes, an inquiry into citizen criminal law or criminal law for individuals qua citizens, only rights qua citizen matter. Needless to say, there is no citizen right to “naturalization,” given that the citizen in waiting cannot have citizen rights: to her, the grant of citizenship itself is a privilege. Citizenship, regardless of its mode acquisition,

51. Duff, in particular, tends to invoke a vision of “the polity” composed of members who fit the image of citizenship as active participation, if not the ideal of republican citizenship, commonly citing university departments as examples of such polities (Duff, supra n. 23, at 49) and portraying criminal responsibility as “just one dimension of civic responsibility” (id. at 50).
is a bundle of privileges and immunities that, as such, are subject to sovereign discretion and revocation. So, for instance, American women learned in the late nineteenth century that their status as citizens did not imply the suffrage. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in *Minor v. Happersett*, women were citizens because:

> Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He *[sic]* owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance.

> “Citizen” simply is the “title” given to such a person and “the relation he bears to the nation.” This title “convey[s] the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more”; specifically, it does not convey suffrage, which neither the U.S. Constitution nor preconstitutional practice included among “the privileges and immunities of citizens.” Since citizenship did not imply suffrage, it took a constitutional amendment (the Nineteenth Amendment, in 1920), to extend to women the privilege to vote.

III.

The Supreme Court’s musings about the nature of citizenship in *Minor* are noteworthy not only because they point out the disjunction between citizenship and equality, which in itself provides a useful corrective to the common presumption of the intimate connection between the two concepts even if one disregards that citizenship itself is defined in contradistinction to inferiors, noncitizens. They also highlight another important thread that runs through various conceptions of citizenship: the element of loyalty, or allegiance, which is brought out most clearly in Shklar’s conception of citizenship as nationality. The idea of mutual allegiance, or fealty, traces itself back at least to the medieval relationship between the lord and his serf (and ultimately to the relation between the householder and members of his household). Breach of the duty (and literally the oath) of fealty was *felonia*, which Maitland and Pollock regarded as the root of

52. 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
the modern concept of felony, if not of crime. Technically, both lord and serf could commit felonia, but the remedy for the lord’s failure to discharge his obligation of protection had significantly less bite than the remedy for the serf’s breach of allegiance (outlawry).

Treason, in this telling, is simply a type of felonia, if a particularly explicit and destructive one. Both represented breaches of the duty of allegiance, which differed only in the sovereign object of disloyalty: the king in the case of treason, and a lord in the case of felony. This distinction affected the division of the spoils of punishment for disloyalty, with the property of the traitor falling to the king (as the offended) and that of the felon to the lord (as offended). The Treason Act of 1351, which distinguished (high) treason, committed against the king, from (petit) treason, committed against a lesser lord, can be seen as a concession by the king to the lords, by defining treason, however broadly, to recognize the existence of an offense of treason, however petit, against lords other than the “our lord the king,” and by providing that the property of the petit traitor fall to the local lord (who, however, would not be around to enjoy it, insofar as he was the paradigmatic victim of petit treason, defined as the governed’s slaying, and not merely imagining the death of, the lord-governor).

The citizen, then, is the modern equivalent to the serf, who owes allegiance not to the lord, but to the more amorphous modern sovereign, who (or which) owes her a duty of protection in return. In this light, the paradigmatic offense of citizen criminal law is treason or felony in the traditional general sense of a breach of the duty of loyalty. What is distinctive about citizen criminal law, then, derives from the status of the offender rather than of the victim. As a citizen, the offender’s act becomes an offense against the sovereign; as a matter of citizen criminal law, crime is not an offense against a fellow person, or for that matter a fellow citizen, but an act of disloyalty. As Shklar puts it in the context of her discussion of Rousseau’s views on citizenship, “The lawbreaking citizen is really a traitor.”


54. Notoriously including “imagining” the death of not only “our Lord, the King,” but also “of our Lady his [Wife] or of their eldest Son and Heir,” along with a long list of other offenses against “our Lord the King, and his Royal Majesty,” including but not limited to giving aid and comfort to the “King’s enemies.”

55. Dubber, supra n. 53, at 35.
Brettschneider does not explicitly draw on this interpretation of citizen criminal law. Jakobs does, relying on what he sees as a long and illustrious tradition of distinguishing citizen criminal law from enemy criminal law, which features not only Rousseau, but also Fichte along with Hobbes and, oddly, Kant. Jakobs cites Rousseau’s general claim that a lawbreaker ceases to be a member of the state through his crime, which amounts to an act of war or treason. As a result, the offender is punished not as citizen but as enemy.56

Fichte similarly regarded crime as a violation of the citizen contract (Bürgervertrag); the offender therefore loses “all his rights as citizen, and as human, and becomes completely rightless.”57 By showing herself incapable of making the rule of law the guiding principle of her actions, the offender reveals herself as unfit for legal status (Rechtsfähigkeit) and the community of rational beings. That could have been the end of it; but considering that in Fichte’s view the state’s sole purpose consisted in protecting the security of its citizens, it may at its discretion offer the offender the opportunity to enter into another, subsidiary, arrangement—the expiation contract (Abbüßungsvertrag)—under which the state could refrain from outlawing the offender in exchange for expiation through punishment, provided the state thereby does not compromise its protective function. Outlawry, however, remains as the sanction for murderers and for those who proved themselves to be incorrigible during their period of expiation. In that case, the offender “is declared a thing, an animal (ein Stück Vieh)” and, following the familiar treatment of outlaws, may be “slaughtered” by anyone without legal sanction.58 (That is not to say, Fichte adds, that killing an outlaw might not attract the same social disapproval, as opposed to legal liability, that may result from torturing animals for pleasure or killing them without reason.)

Fichte’s theory might seem fanciful, but it is worth noting that the central idea of regarding outlawry as the paradigmatic sanction also finds historical support in the work of Heinrich Brunner. Brunner portrayed all criminal sanctions as offshoots from outlawry (Abspaltungen der Friedlosigkeit), a state of “peacelessness” into which the offender had placed

56. Jakobs, supra n. 33.
58. Id. at 272.
himself through his act. As an outlaw—that is, an individual who was not under the protection (peace or mund) of another—the offender was literally at the mercy of others, including but not limited to the victim, who could do with him as they pleased, as illustrated by the summary execution of “hand-having” thieves (that is, thieves caught red-handed). The permissibility of inflicting death did not imply the obligation to kill. In fact, the punitive response was entirely discretionary, with options ranging from the ultimate penalty to lesser penalties, which were permissible a fortiori, to abstention.

Brunner’s view, shared by Pollock and Maitland, can shed light on the continued disenfranchisement of felons. One might interpret this practice within the context of the general phenomenon of disenfranchisement. In this light, the disenfranchisement of felons reflects their incapacity to govern themselves, rather than be governed, which they were thought to share with others, notably slaves, women, and the poor. In this view, felons retained their citizenship status but were denied one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. Under Brunner’s account of the splintering of outlawry into lesser penalties, felons have committed the paradigmatic offense of disloyalty (felonia) and, as traitors, are expelled (or expelled themselves) from the sovereign’s protection. Rather than exercising his (or its) privilege to leave them to die at the hands of anyone anytime anywhere—the fate of the peaceless—the state may choose to deprive them only of some of the privileges of membership in the political community; instead of outright outlawry, felons only suffer “civil death.”

Jakobs sees himself as continuing Rousseau’s and Fichte’s project of distinguishing between citizen and enemy in principle, but prefers to reserve the enemy status for particular offenders, rather than attaching it to all offenders, both because the offender has a right to reintegration into society and because she has no right to remove herself from society on her own account, thus evading her duty of restitution. Jakobs finds a more differentiated approach to the classification of citizens and enemies in the work of Hobbes and Kant. Hobbes, according to Jakobs, limits enemy status to traitors, who through

59. Heinrich Brunner, Abspaltungen der Friedlosigkeit, in Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und französischen Rechtes 444 (1894).
61. Jakobs, supra n. 33, at 89.
their act of disloyalty remove themselves from the protection of the sovereign. More surprising, Jakobs cites a footnote in Perpetual Peace in support of the claim that Kant advocated treating as an enemy, rather than as a person, anyone who poses a “continuous threat” through his refusal to enter into a state of communal legality (gemeinschaftlich-gesetzlichen Zustand).

For present purposes, it makes no difference whether or not Jakobs’s interpretation of Rousseau, Fichte, Hobbes, and Kant in particular is correct. Jakobs might well have cited others who drew similar distinctions at the time: Thomas Jefferson, for instance, in the preamble to his remarkably unambitious, yet unjustly neglected, 1778 Virginia Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, which promised a system of criminal law “deduc[ed] from the purposes of society,” distinguished between an offender who, “committing an inferior injury, does not wholly forfeit the protection of his fellow citizens,” and those “whose existence is become inconsistent with the safety of their fellow citizens.” Whereas the former, “after suffering a punishment in proportion to his offence, is entitled to [his fellow citizens’] protection from all greater pain,” the latter, which include traitors and murderers, must be not punished, but “exterminate[d].”

The point instead is to illustrate the nature as well as the depth of Jakobs’s distinction between citizen criminal law and enemy criminal law. Although he uses citizen and person interchangeably, suggesting alternately that the enemy lacks the capacity for citizenhood or for personhood, the enemy’s distinguishing feature, if there is one, appears to be his disloyalty. Even if an enemy offender can satisfy some abstract definition of personhood, he ought not to be treated as citizen because he lacks the requisite ability to “act according to loyalty to law.” As such, they are not subject to legal punishment but to police regulation as those who “threaten to destroy the legal order,” rather than as “delinquent citizens, persons, who have made a mistake.” According to Jakobs, the terrorist is the paradigmatic object of enemy criminal law.

63. Jakobs, supra n. 33, at 91.
64. Id. at 93.
Note that, although most of the references to terrorism in Jakobs, as in other discussions of citizen criminal law, cite the “acts of September 11, 2001,” bin Laden, or Al Qaeda, the terrorist’s citizen status under positive law, or under some other concept of citizenship, appears to be irrelevant in Jakobs’s account. It therefore appears that, in Jakobs’s view of the distinction between citizen criminal law and enemy criminal law, the paradigmatic offense of enemy criminal law is disloyalty, including but not limited to the breach of the duty of loyalty, which presumably would apply only to citizens in the first place.

The duty of loyalty, and the attendant sanction for its breach, also lies at the heart of Michael Pawlik’s account of citizen criminal law.65 Pawlik does not make explicit reference to the classification of terrorists or acts of terrorism, and is not primarily concerned with the distinction between “citizens” and “enemies.” His project is closer to Brettschneider’s (and Duff’s) than it is to Jakobs’s; he introduces the concept of citizenship as part of a comprehensive theory of criminal law, rather than as classificatory device. Unlike Jakobs, he is not concerned with the question of how to treat those who do not qualify as citizens, but rather with the preliminary question of the significance of citizenhood in the legitimation of state punishment. “Person,” “subject,” and “citizen,” in Pawlik’s view, are different aspects of a single individual; citizenship and enemyhood, by contrast, are mutually exclusive: an individual is treated as either one or the other. Pawlik is interested in citizen criminal law exclusively, without considering, or even acknowledging the existence of, enemy criminal law.

As a theory of citizen criminal law, however, Pawlik’s resembles Jakobs’s in its emphasis on loyalty. Loosely tracking Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Pawlik’s account proceeds from criminal law for persons, to criminal law for subjects, and eventually to criminal law for citizens. From the perspective of the person and of the subject (a particular manifestation of the abstract capacities of a person), crime is (merely) a private wrong. We need the perspective of the citizen to capture the public wrongness of crime. The assumption appears to be that citizen criminal law presumes both a citizen offender and a citizen victim, though the discussion focuses exclusively on the offender’s status. The distinctive feature of crime in the realm of citizenhood, then, is the breach of

loyalty, and punishment the reaffirmation of its significance.\textsuperscript{66} It is clear that this loyalty is not owed to individuals (as persons or subjects). But to whom, or what, is it owed? Candidates include \textit{"the community of law,"}\textsuperscript{67} \textit{"the legal order,"}\textsuperscript{68} \textit{"fellow citizens,"}\textsuperscript{69} and \textit{"the project of a ‘peace through law.’"}\textsuperscript{70}

Both Jakobs and Pawlik, then, appear to operate with a concept of citizenhood that differs from personhood in only one respect: the citizen’s duty of loyalty. (Though, again, Jakobs uses the two interchangeably; Pawlik places far more emphasis on the distinction between personhood and citizenship than Jakobs does.) The nature of this loyalty remains troublingly indeterminate; most commonly, it is referred to as \textit{“loyalty to law”} (\textit{Rechtstreue}). The significance of this loyalty, however defined, becomes clear in Pawlik’s definition of crime (as a violation of loyalty) and Jakobs’s distinction between citizen and enemy criminal law (delinquents who have loyalty are, as citizens, subject to citizen criminal law, and those who do not are, as enemies, subject to enemy criminal law).

A view of criminal law that assigns pride of place to the concept of loyalty may be difficult to distinguish from a view of criminal law that regards treason as the paradigmatic offense, or more precisely, that regards the breach of loyalty characteristic of treason as a necessary ingredient of every crime, as in fact the feature that elevates a wrong to the level of a public wrong legitimately subject to state punishment. Whereas it is unclear to whom, or to what, loyalty is owed, it is clear that loyalty is not owed to particular individuals, notably the immediate victim of the offense. As we’ve seen, loyalty is owed either to an abstract concept (law) or to a social objective (peace through law) or to a form of social order (legal order) or to a community of some form or another (fellow citizen, community of law). In the end, loyalty in this context is owed to a sovereign, whoever or whatever that might be. According to standard U.S. constitutional ideology, the distinction between the political community (“the people”) and the sovereign has been discarded. As a result, \textit{“allegiance . . . is . . . due . . . to the people, with whom the sovereign power is found.”}\textsuperscript{71} This categorical

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\item \textsuperscript{66} Pawlik, supra n. 65, at 95.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Id. at 89 n.50.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Id. at 83.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Id. at 86.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Id. at 92.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 260 (1967).
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denial of a sovereign apart from the people within his or its power does not affect the traditional mutuality of fealty: “Allegiance imports an obligation on the citizen or subject, the correlative right to which resides in the sovereign power.”

The political and legal history of the United States illustrates that the definitional identification of “the people” and “the sovereign” has done little to alter the basic dynamic of the age-old relationship between sovereign and subject. The fundamental question remains—Who is sovereign and who is not? Who governs and who is governed?—except that now the question of sovereignty has been recast as a question of membership in “the people,” that is, as a question of citizenship. That question, however, is as old as the problem of government itself. As Judith Shklar remarked, “There is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, and non more variable in history, or contested in theory.” For this reason, a normative theory of criminal law—or for that matter even a descriptive account of penal practice—that places weight on the concept of citizenship would do well to define the operative concept of citizenship in some detail, with sensitivity to historical and contemporary meaning in a variety of relevant contexts, including positive law (notably criminal law, immigration law, and “national security” law), policy practice and rhetoric (beyond law as a form of state action), and various theoretical discourses (including, but not limited to, those that explicitly grapple with questions of citizenship).

IV.

Perhaps there is an alternative account of citizen criminal law that does not turn on the bond of mutual allegiance between sovereign and subject, and regards treason, being the breach of the subject’s duty of allegiance, as the paradigmatic offense. Perhaps there is an account of citizen criminal law that does not

72. Id. at 260.
73. Shklar, supra n. 4, at 1.
law that avoids the pitfalls of the deployment of citizenship as an exclusionary and hierarchical concept throughout the history of political life and thought. Perhaps it is possible, for instance, to construct such an account as part of a larger project of what Duff calls “republican liberal communitarianism.”

The promise of any theory of citizen criminal law would draw from the concept of citizenhood upon which it relies. Without an apparent grounding in positive law and in the face of overwhelming evidence of the pernicious influence of the rhetoric of citizenship, the burden of persuasion would seem to rest on the proponents of the view that citizenship does matter or, even if it does not, that it should matter in criminal law.

Clearly, citizenship retains great power as an analytic device even today. As has been pointed out many times before, much of contemporary criminal law can be understood as a war on crime pitting ordinary law-abiding citizens against enemies of the state of one form or another, be they (suspected) minority offenders, (suspected) incorrigible offenders, or (suspected) terrorists (or those suspected to have assisted them, however remotely). Jakobs’s distinction between citizen criminal law and enemy criminal law has resonated also because it reflected a distinction long familiar from public and private discourse; it is provocative because it transferred this analytic distinction into the realm of normative criminal law theory.

This transition from descriptive force to normative significance is troubling, not only for the obvious reasons, but more specifically because the descriptive purchase is not only limited in general, given the irrelevance of citizenship in positive criminal law, but limited specifically to the unsavory and critique-worthy aspects of contemporary penality. As a result, one might expect that a normative theory of criminal law would seek to eliminate, rather than to centralize, the discourse of citizenship.

76. Duff, supra n. 23, at 50 n.36.