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Number of Pages (including this page):/
Nombre de pages (y compris celle-ci):

INSTRUCTIONS:

Will call this afternoon to discuss,

5/2/02

BOEHM Peter - WSHDC -GR -C4

m: FURTADO Francis - WSHDC -GR -C4
 dt: November 1, 2002 5:38 PM
 co: -EXTOTT -JPD -C4
 cc: -EXTOTT -JCD -C4; -EXTOTT -ISI -C4; -EXTOTT -ISD -C4; -EXTOTT -NAD -C4; -EXTOTT -
 NUR -C4; -EXTOTT -IDR -C4; SINCLAIR Jill -IDD -C4; HOFFMANN Ron -IDR -C4;
 HELFAND Lisa -IDR -C4; WALMA Michael -IDR -C4; WHITING Shelley -JLH -C4;
 SOLOMON Jonathan -ISI -C4; KERGIN Michael - WSHDC -HOM -C4; BOEHM Peter -
 WSHDC -GR -C4; FORTIER Patricia - WSHDC -GR -C4; DIGANGI John - WSHDC -GR -C4;
 LALANI Arif - WSHDC -GR -C4; SHAPARDANOV Chris - WSHDC -GR -C4; COATS
 Subject: UNGR0315 - Visit of Canadian Officials to Guantanamo Bay: Meeting with [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] (1 November 2002)

SECRET

1. On November 1, we met with [REDACTED] who provided us with additional detail on the provisions for national visits to detainees at Guantanamo Bay. He was accompanied by [REDACTED]

2. We opened the discussion by noting the profile that the Khadr case had acquired in Canada, both at the political level and among various Canadian government agencies. Media interest in Canada was high (at least in part because of Khadr's status as a minor), and had been boosted by stories in the *Washington Post* that had referred to the intelligence information that Khadr had yielded under interrogation. [REDACTED] and that we were eager to gain early access to Khadr as part of a plan to manage the issue in Canada.

[REDACTED] said that he had noted the *Washington Post* article with some chagrin. It has been the practice [REDACTED] The US was asking all of its partners to do the same.

4. As for Khadr himself, [REDACTED] confirmed that he was involved in the firefight that had led to the death of the US special forces medic, had received life-saving surgery on the battlefield, and additional care in theatre, before being judged well enough to make the trip to Guantanamo. [REDACTED] As a combatant, he is being treated like any other detainee. He is being given no special status as a minor, but has his own cell, and is not in contact with the others. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] very eager for Canadian security and law enforcement officials to visit Khadr. They are assuming that we are pursuing cases of our own to which Khadr would be relevant, and the [REDACTED] would like to share intelligence information with us on these matters as well. [REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED] In terms of the details required in the application, the US noted the basic data on the officials in question (name, place of birth, passport number, official capacity), plus a list of the individuals to whom the team would like access (and, a specific rationale in the case of non-Canadian citizens). Once the visit request is approved, Canadian team would make its way [REDACTED] and depart for Guantanamo when a flight is available (they do not leave on a daily basis). This would [REDACTED] and that a number of [REDACTED] countries were in line with cases that were equally as compelling as Canada's. [REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED] offered some advice for our application. First, the purpose of the visit was the collection and sharing of information for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Consular visits were a non-starter, and applications that appeared to be consular visits by other means would be scrutinized very closely -- which could lead to delays. We noted that, as part of our normal practice, a Canadian mission to Guantanamo would include a DFAIT official and asked if this would be problematic. The US responded that this would not necessarily be a problem. Foreign ministry officials had been part of other visiting delegations. The US initially noted that these officials were often indispensable to confirming the identification of the detainees, but then stressed that, as long as the core of the mission -- to maximize cooperation on the intelligence and law enforcement front -- was not affected, a DFAIT presence would be acceptable. (Comment: we are taking this to mean that the US would be open to the presence of a DFAIT official -- on the political side, for example). The US stated that our suggestion of a 3-member team was "ideal", and that repeated visits were not only possible, but would, in some cases, be required.

8. We asked if the need for additional detention at the facility was related to any criminal charges pertaining to the death of the US serviceman [REDACTED] would only say that in the first instance [REDACTED] They offered nothing further on the question of criminal prosecution.

9. We asked how the information gleaned as part of the interview processes would be shared. [REDACTED]

10. Comment. Our [REDACTED] are very eager for a Canadian team to visit Guantanamo. They took on board the political profile that this issue has acquired in Canada, and we believe that, within the limits on accommodation, and the clear intelligence focus of the activities at Guantanamo, they will do everything possible to expedite our visit. The first visit will be important; we should move promptly to define our objectives and submit our application.

[REDACTED]