Modernist Islamic Political Thought and the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions of 2011
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I. Introduction

When protests broke out in Tunisia in December 2010, few people predicted that those events would usher in a season of revolution throughout the Arab world. From the first moments of the Arab revolutions, questions were raised whether political Islam, and in particular, groups such as The Renaissance Party (al-Nahda) in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in Egypt, had any role in the revolutions. The popular press, meanwhile, emphasized the bravery and the persistence of the Tunisian and Egyptian people in waging largely non-violent demonstrations against brutal police states, and went out of its way to minimize, or even deny entirely, the role of Islam in these two popular revolutions. This latter theme in particular seems to have been a self-conscious product of the media’s sympathy with the popular revolutions, a stance that would have been difficult, if not impossible to sustain if the revolutions had been characterized as explicitly Islamic.

The attempt to minimize the role of Islam in these revolutions in the cause of maintaining inter-cultural solidarity, while laudable, does little to help us understand the course of Islamic political thought over the last 150 years in the Arab world, its relationship to the democratic demands of the Arab peoples, and the prospects for a reconciliation between modern Islamic political thought and certain forms of democratic secularism. Indeed, the central hypothesis of this paper is that neither the Tunisian nor the Egyptian Revolutions could have succeeded without the contributions of Islamic modernism to modern political thought in the Arab world. In important respects, the Egyptian and Tunisian states had both claimed the mantle of Islamic
modernism to justify their constitutional and legal orders.\(^1\) And while it is impossible to predict what the new constitutional orders of Egypt and Tunis will look like, one core demand, indeed, perhaps the \emph{only} demand that united the various forces that came together to produce the successful revolutions, was the desire to replace regimes that had systematically undermined the legality of the state and transformed the law from a neutral measure of justice into a tool to enrich the ruling elite and to punish its enemies. The desire to control government, ensure that it is accountable to the public, that it legislates for the public good, and that it applies its law fairly, however, were the core demands of modernist Islamic political thought. To the extent that the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes can be viewed as Islamic modernist regimes, and to the extent that these revolutions were fundamentally about restoring the legitimacy of the state against the regimes that had subverted them, it would not be erroneous to call both revolutions “Islamic” in the very specific sense of “modernist” Islam.

A crucial feature of modernist Islamic political thought, at least as manifested in the Islamic modernist traditions in Tunisian and Egyptian intellectual history, is its insistence that religious teachings, insofar as they are relevant to building political society, must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the goals of freedom, national development and democratic decision-making. This modernist configuration of the theo-political in turn renders political coalitions with non-Islamic political movements palatable. Indeed, in important respects, Islamic modernists are politically more comfortable with secular political movements than they are with

\(^1\) Space does not permit a full justification for this statement, but both Tunisia and Egypt, in their first post-World War I constitutions, self-consciously included Islam as the religion of state in full awareness of, and in contrast to, Kemalist secularism; both states chose to reform Islamic family law using Islamic modernist justifications rather than adopt European family codes; and, in the case of Egypt at least, its civil code claimed to be both fully Islamic and modern.
other potential configurations of the Islamic theo-political. Accordingly, casual distinctions between the secular and religious may not be very helpful in capturing the motivations of the men and women who struggled against great odds, and in many cases, losing life and limb, to topple the regimes of Zayn al-ʻAbidin Ben ʻAli and Mohamed Hosni Mubarak. It was the successful cooperation between modernist Islamic movements and secular opposition movements which ultimately guaranteed the success of these two revolutions; moreover, a successful transition to democracy will require their continued cooperation.

II. What is Modernist Islamic Political Thought?

Rawls, in his work Political Liberalism, identified the central problem of modern democracy as that of pluralism, or more specifically, how to understand the stability of democracy in the context of pluralism. To speak of “modernist” Islamic political thought is to suggest that it is concerned with particular problems that distinguish it both from modern liberal political thought and other traditions of Islamic political thought. In my opinion the central problem which distinguishes modernist Islamic political thought from other Islamic traditions is how to establish an effective system of Islamic justice in the context of a post-enlightenment world characterized by rapid scientific, economic and political change. Like other traditions of Sunni Islamic political thought, they share a fundamental commitment to the truth of Islam as a theological doctrine and that it provides a completely adequate and universal system of justice through Islamic law (the Sharī‘a). Unlike other traditions of Islamic political thought, however, they also

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2 In the contemporary Sunni world, credible alternatives to Islamic modernism exist in Sunni traditionalism, which espoused a combination of strict adherence to historical teachings of the doctrinal legal and theological schools along with a strong doctrine of political quietism, and Salafism, which, although it rejects the binding authority of the doctrinal schools of law, substitutes instead a strong commitment to adherence to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and the earliest generations of the Muslim community as documented in various historical sources. Salafism is usually politically quietist, although this is not always the case. Importantly, neither the Sunni Traditionalists, nor the Salafists, adopt the nationalist project as part of a religious imperative that needs to inform how Muslims understand Islam in the modern age.

accept the legitimacy of the political, economic and scientific accomplishments of the post-
enlightenment world, while professing to maintain an objectively Islamic metaphysics. Unlike 
other post-enlightenment traditions of political thought, modernist Islamic political thought 
retains an explicitly theistic metaphysics in which revelation retains a foundational role in 
establishing political legitimacy.

Somewhat paradoxically, modernist Islamic political thought takes the appearance of a 
thoroughly secular movement from the perspective of other Islamic traditions of political 
thought, but viewed from the perspective of humanistic political philosophy, it takes the 
appearance of a thoroughly religious movement. Neither of these characterizations is entirely 
unwarranted: from the perspective of other traditions of Islamic political thought, modernist 
Islamic political thought is, at a minimum, a secularizing tradition of thought insofar as it 
substantially reduces the scope of life that is subject to religious reason in favor of non-religious 
reasoning; from the perspective of humanist traditions of political thought, modernist Islamic 
political thought reinforces and strengthens religious claims to recognition in the public sphere 
and to that extent sacralizes politics in a way otherwise inconceivable from the perspective of 
humanistic post-Enlightenment political philosophies.

The most obvious consequence of the continued sacralization, even if only partial, of the 
public sphere is the conspicuous absence from modernist Islamic political thought of pluralism, 
particularly religious pluralism, including atheism, and its relationship to equality. The different 
histories of the Middle East and Europe are probably responsible for the different trajectories 
post-Enlightenment political thought took in Christian Europe and the Islamic Middle East. The 
absence of all-out religious wars that sought the elimination of non-conformist religious 
communities in the former led in the Middle East to a hierarchical system of pluralism grounded
in Islamic law. While this system was internally justified to Sunni Muslims by its truth, non-Muslims were expected to obey the law on the premise that the political order of Sunni Islam was a just one that guaranteed non-Muslims their essential rights. Legally, this relationship was manifested through the doctrine of *dhimma*, pursuant to which non-Muslims agreed to bind themselves to the non-religious norms of Islamic law (*iltizām aḥkām al-islām*). In exchange for this commitment, the Muslim community undertook to afford such non-Muslims all the legal (but not political) rights and protections afforded to Muslims on a basis of equality, but affording non-Muslims freedom to observe their own religious practices. This system was encapsulated in two statements attributed to the Prophet Muhammad who was reported as saying that if non-Muslims accepted this relationship, “They have our rights and our obligations” (*lahum mā lanā wa ‘alayhim mā ‘alaynā*), but that “they should be left alone in their religious affairs” (*yutrkūna wa mā yadinūnā*). Accordingly, so long as Muslim political authorities applied Islamic law fairly and impartially, the rights of non-Muslims would be fully respected, even though they did not necessarily participate in their formulation.

By the 19th century, however, important transformations in the relationship between Islamic states and Europe had shaken the confidence of the Sunni political and religious elite. In particular, the Ottomans no longer seemed able to defend Islamic territories against encroaching European powers, and while initially its military weaknesses were felt primarily outside the Middle Eastern heartland of Islam, in 1798 French forces under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, successfully invaded and occupied Egypt. In the wake of the obvious weakness of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis Europe, the political class ushered in a series of political,

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4 Although Hanafi jurists regularly cite these two principles as statements of the Prophet, see, e.g., al-Kashmīrī, *Fayd al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣahīḥ al-Bukhārī* (“lā yuqtal muslim fī kāfir”), I have not been able to locate them in any collection of hadiths. The 19th century Hanafi jurist, Ibn ʿĀbidin, however, quotes the fourth Sunni caliph, and the first Shiʿī Imām, ʿĀlī b. Abī Ṭālib as saying “They agreed to pay *jiya* [i.e., the poll-tax] only so that their lives and properties could be like our lives and properties.” *Kitab al-Jihād*. 
administrative, and increasingly, legal, reforms, first in Egypt and then throughout the Ottoman
Empire. These reforms, generally known as the Tanẓīmāt, were intended to usher in a new era,
*al-niẓām al-jadīd*.

Modernist Islamic political thought can be viewed as the theoretical counterpart to the
tanẓīmāt. The task of modernist Islamic political theory was to produce a theory of Islamic law
and the state that reconciled the new order to the underlying ideology of Sunni political theory,
namely, that the state is bound to Islamic law. The answer they give, essentially, is that the new
order – an important part of which was legal reform – did not contradict or supplant the Sharī‘a,
but instead vindicated it by making it more effective. Islamic modernists’ quest to make the
Sharī‘a more effective in turn required them to argue for profound changes in the way Muslims
understood Islamic law, its relationship to rational politics (political philosophy), the relationship
of the ruler and the ruled, and the rights of non-Muslims.

III. Overview of Islamic Modernist Political Ideas

Rifā‘a Rāfi‘ al-Ṭahtāwī (d. 1873) is usually taken to be the forerunner of Islamic modernism. As a young
man who had only recently concluded his studies at the mosque college of al-Azhar,
he was selected to accompany the first delegation of Egyptian students sent to France to study
the “modern sciences.” Ṭahtāwī was a keen observer and student of French life and upon his
return to Cairo, he published a widely-read memoire (*Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fi Talkhīṣ Bārīz*) which
described his experiences in Paris, and the social, cultural, political and economic life of 19th

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century France. Although he dedicated only a small portion of his memoires to the French legal and political system, including, its constitution, he was clearly impressed by its constitution and that French law was an effective tool in controlling the arbitrary will of the state. At the same time he expressed anxiety to the extent that the French legal order was not, consciously at least, derived from revelation. This theme, the relationship between revealed law and rational law would continue to interest him, and he would return to in much greater detail later in his life in a lengthy educational treatise, al-Murshid al-Amīn li-l-Banāt wa-l-Banīn (“The Reliable Guide for Girls and Boys”).

Ṭahṭāwi also had a distinguished career in the Egyptian government, and served in a variety of administrative positions in the new Egyptian bureaucracy, including, as director of the newly established medical school; translator for the artillery school; director of the School of Foreign Languages in which capacity he supervised the translation of thousands of works in various fields into Arabic; director of the Military School; editor of the official newspaper; and an educational journal. He also participated in numerous educational reform commissions and personally translated two dozen French works.

Ṭahṭāwi identified three basic features of French law that he found admirable: first, its provisions bound the King; second, that it applied equally to all Frenchmen; and third, that it promoted the citizens’ freedom, because they could act securely in the knowledge that nothing

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9 Kurzman, Modernist Islam, supra n. 5, p. 31.

10 Takhlīṣ, 169.

11 Id., 180-181.
would befall them if they behaved in conformity with the law.\textsuperscript{12} There remained, however, the troubling question of the metaphysical foundations of French law: they were clearly “rational,” i.e., not derived from revelation, and he remained committed to a political system whose foundations were revelatory.\textsuperscript{13}

Ṭahṭāwī attempted to work out a more systematic account of the relationship of rational law to revealed law in \textit{The Reliable Guide}. Central to his argument was the notion of the \textit{waṭan}, the homeland, and the obligations that individuals have to honor it and improve it. This process of improvement, which is both material and moral, Ṭahṭāwī calls \textit{tamaddun}, “civilizing.” Revealed law and rational law work together toward this end. While mankind had a kind of instinctual natural law that enabled it to live prior to such time that God sent prophets, revelation established the foundation for true civilization, with Islam establishing the foundations for universal civilization. Non-Muslim civilizations also had drawn on the foundational principles of Islam to develop their own civilizations, according to al-Ṭahṭāwī, but because they base their civilization (\textit{tamaddun}) solely on reason (\textit{ʻaql}) rather than revelation (\textit{shar\’}), they risk including activities within the scope of civilization that are in fact not part of civilization at all, e.g., the casual mixing of the sexes. In any case, it is the task of the ruler to develop rational law (\textit{qānūn siyāsa}) that aims to improve and honor the homeland. To do this, the citizens must enjoy civic freedom (\textit{al-ḥurriyya al-madaniyya}), i.e., not be subject to punishment or other interference in the exercise of legal privileges, and to secure this end, it is as though the citizens have promised one another mutual support in the exercise of their lawful rights and against anyone who would interfere in the exercise of those rights. Civic freedom, and the rational laws that nourish it, are

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Id.}, 181.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Id.}, 188.
not in opposition to revealed law, but rather are their perfection and fulfillment, for the apex of civilization (tamaddun) is a polity whose citizens embody the prophetic statement, “None of you believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.”

Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī (d. 1890) had an illustrious career as an Ottoman statesman, rising first to the rank of chief minister to the ruler of Tunis where he helped institute wide-ranging reforms in that North African Ottoman province, and then became the chief minister of the Ottoman Empire, a position in which he served a mere eight months before resigning due to policy differences with the Sultan. His principal political ideas are found in his book, *Aqwam al-Masālik ilā Maʿrifat Ahwāl al-Mamālik* [*The Surest Path to Knowledge of the Conditions of Nations*].

Khayr al-Dīn’s chief contribution to modernist Islamic political thought was his frontal assault against autocracy, which he identified as the principal cause of backwardness in the Muslim world. The answer to autocracy was a revitalization of the Sharīʿa’s anti-autocratic principle of *shūrā*, deliberation or consultation. According to Khayr al-Dīn, consultative government was necessary for two reasons, even assuming a fair-minded and sincere autocrat: first, Islamic law only permitted the ruler to act in a manner consistent with the public welfare (*al-maṣlaha*), but even the most diligent, fair-minded, and sincere ruler is incapable of knowing

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14 *Al-Murshid al-Amīn*, pp. 90-133.


17 Id., 99.

18 Id., 42.
the public interest independently; and, second, the ruler is not permitted to legislate in a manner that contradicts Islamic law, but it is not possible for the ruler, by himself, to know whether his proposals are in conformity with the law without relying on the input of legal specialists. Deliberation is given an institutional form through the notion of the *ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʻaqd*, the leading figures of the community, which would include religious leaders, leading members of the military, the civilian bureaucracy and the merchants. Their duty is to assist the ruler discharge his task by providing the necessary information to allow for an accurate assessment of where the public interest lies, and to insure that the ruler does not transgress the law. Khayr al-Dīn justifies the *ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʻaqd*’s monitoring function by reference to the Islamic concept of “commanding the good and prohibiting the evil (*al-amr bi-l-maʻrūf wa-l-nahy ʻan al-munkar*).” The *ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʻaqd* must discharge this monitoring function because the law, although it is intended as a restraint (*wazi‘*) against arbitrary rule, is itself helpless to vindicate the law when it is broken. By acting as monitors of legality, the *ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʻaqd*, in Khayr al-Dīn’s theory, act as an institutional restraint (*wāzi‘*) to insure that the ruler respects the law.

The law that binds the ruler is of course the Sharīʿa, but not in the traditional sense; rather, it is law derived from “the foundations of the Sharīʿa (*uṣūl al-sharīʿa*)” but whose precise content should be the result of a cooperative effort between the technocratic policy experts of the state and the jurists. This law, in effect, is the substance of the *Tanzīmāt*, the great 19th century Ottoman reform efforts, which introduced a host of reforms in the administrative, economic, educational and legal organization of the Ottoman Empire, all of which Khayr al-Dīn justifies as

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19 Id. 111.
20 Id. 110.
21 Id. 101-102.
22 Id. 153.
fulfilling the intended purposes of the Sharī‘a by securing more effective justice, and accordingly, was not only in conformity with the Sharī‘a, but in fact required by it. For the reforms to succeed, however, religious scholars would have to abandon their traditional role in favor of a much more forward looking system of education that focused on modern knowledge and integrate themselves more organically with the state rather than distancing themselves from politics based on a false assumption that piety demanded maintaining their distance from political life.\(^{23}\)

Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) was the chief disciple of the celebrated Egyptian modernist and religious reformer, Muḥammad ʻAbduh (d. 1905), and he wrote extensively on issues related to politics, Islamic law and religious and social reform.\(^{24}\) Writing at the end of World War I, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic which preserved only a symbolic role for the “Ottoman Caliph,” Riḍā set out what he believed to be the three political options available to Muslim peoples.\(^{25}\) The first was a continuation of traditional politics of the sort that dominated the late Ottoman Empire, in which both religious and political life was characterized by a mutually-reinforcing political and religious despotism (\textit{istibdād}). The second was to adopt a radically secular approach to political life in the manner espoused by Kamal Muṣṭafā (Attaturk) and which had produced the Turkish Republic. The third was to adopt a program of reform (\textit{iṣlāḥ}) which would dismantle religious and political despotism in the Islamic world, protect the basic Islamic character of the state, and be open to European civilization.

\(^{23}\) Id., 152-153.

\(^{24}\) For more on Riḍā, see Hourani, pp. 221-244 and Malcolm Kerr, \textit{Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muḥammad ʻAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā} (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966).

The first option would be catastrophic, as it would deliver the government to those in Muslim society least capable of performing government’s most elementary functions, and to make things worse, its incompetence would be justified in the name of traditional religious doctrines of fidelity to the ruler and to the ancient teachings of the jurists.\textsuperscript{26} The second option at least has the virtue of offering Muslims the prospect of competent rule, but at the price of a new kind of despotism and the religiously catastrophic institutionalization of secularism.\textsuperscript{27} The third option was superior therefore because it would respect Muslims’ religious commitments, but at the same time, because it offered a flexible and non-dogmatic approach to Islamic law, the reformist program stood ready to adopt the reforms in Islamic law necessary to make it a viable system of modern law that could secure the independence, progress and dignity of Muslim peoples.\textsuperscript{28}

The key to Riḍā’s program of legal reform was replacing what he called “religious despotism” (\textit{al-istibdād al-dīnī}) that depended on a system of unqualified deference (\textit{taqlīd}) to historical authorities with a new legal system that would be consistent with popular sovereignty (\textit{siyādat al-shaʻb})\textsuperscript{29} and whose method of law-making would rely on independent reasoning (\textit{ijtihād}),\textsuperscript{30} exercised collectively through deliberative institutions rather than individualistically as conceived of in classical jurisprudence (\textit{uṣūl al-fiqh}). This process of legislation, which he called \textit{ishtirā}, was expressly a kind of positive, man-made law, but produced by reason’s

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\textsuperscript{26} Id., 72. \\
\textsuperscript{27} Id., 70-72, 97. \\
\textsuperscript{28} Id., 69-70. \\
\textsuperscript{29} Id., 45. \\
\textsuperscript{30} Id., 89. \\
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reflection not only on secular realities, but also the truths of revelation. This new kind of Islamic law would also solve the problem of political despotism because in all cases it would ensure that the state is either enforcing a categorical revelatory norm (al-sharī‘a) or an opinion of the community (ra‘y al-umma).

While revealed law provided points of reference in Riḍā’s scheme, it did not form categorical obstacles to legislative enactments that were needed for the public good, even when such enactments contradicted revealed law. Riḍā explains this seemingly strange result by claiming that revealed law is categorical only with respect to ritual observance; as for its regulations of secular life, Muslims were free to adopt legislation that went beyond or even contradicted these texts because the intent of those rules was not to prove devotion to God, but rather to further human welfare. When other methods are discovered that achieve the same end, or achieve them in a more efficient fashion, there is no harm in Muslims adopting those rules.

Finally, for Riḍā adoption of the reform party’s agenda would also solve the problem of atheism in the Islamic world. In Riḍā’s analysis, atheism was the product not of careful philosophical or theological reflection, but rather that of the immoral alliance between political and religious despotism that worked hand-in-glove to preclude Muslim peoples from gaining political freedom and participating in modern civilization.

For all three of these thinkers, a stripped-down version of the Sharī‘a, i.e., its “foundations,” combined with rational law derived in light of those foundations, and in the case of Khayr al-Dīn and Riḍā, representative institutions, provided the basis for good government.

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31 Id., 101-105.
32 Id., 9.
33 Id., 94.
34 Id., 70-72.
and political freedom for Muslim peoples. By solving the problem of despotism, these thinkers hoped to ensure that Muslim governments would reliably legislate for the public interest, and by establishing institutions to make sure that those laws would be applied impartially, good government would be restored to the Muslim world and they would be able to take their rightful place as independent states in the modern world. Indeed, for all three of these thinkers, religious and political (“rational”) virtues were mutually-reinforcing, leading to the moral, material and political progress of human society.

IV. Conclusion

The fundamental goal of modernist Islamic political thought was to define what good governance in accordance with the Sharī‘a meant in the modern age. The conclusions they reached all entailed supplanting the detailed, technical rules of historical Islamic law in favor of adopting “rational” methods of law-making that focused on the public good, while taking into account the “foundations” of the Sharī‘a. Because of the practical priority of rational law over revealed law, one could easily make the mistake that little separates Islamic modernists from their secularist counterparts. This would be mistaken. Secular modernists continue to be suspicious of religion generally, and view it to be a dangerous force that can potentially subvert public goals of development and freedom. For the Islamic modernists, however, Islam is not only a true religion, it also reinforces the fundamental political values needed to build a modern polity. And, in what constitutes perhaps the most important bone of contention that divides “Islamic” political parties from secular parties, Islam provides a set of baseline moral commitments that justify restricting the scope of individual freedoms, the most prominent being sexual freedom. So while there is little disagreement in either Egypt or Tunisia regarding the basic questions of democracy, e.g., representative democracy, separation of powers, impartial
administration of justice, fair elections, etc., there continues to be deep division on the extent to which Islamic justifications should be permitted to restrict personal freedoms.

Given the history of modernist Islamic political thought, this logjam regarding personal rights ought not to be surprising. As this essay has shown, late 19th and early 20th century modernist Islamic political thought was concerned almost exclusively with questions regarding “good governance” and how to overcome despotism. This suggests deep metaphysical division continues to exist in Muslim societies such as Egypt and Tunisia regarding the scope of various personal freedoms. Accordingly, it is unrealistic to expect either the Egyptian or Tunisian revolutions to produce constitutions that are fully compatible with liberalism and popular sovereignty. And this is another reason why it is legitimate to understand these revolutions as Islamic modernist revolutions: the only values that are universally shared among the various parties are the precisely the values of good governance that were the goal of the Islamic modernists.

Islamic modernism, therefore, continues to be salient if only because it continues to respond to the most pressing political issues facing citizens of the Arab world today, namely, despotism, poor-governance, and outright corruption. “The Arab Spring,” as this revolutionary moment has come to be called, will be successful if it institutionalizes the “good governance” project that lay behind Islamic modernism. Achievement of reasonable pluralism, of the sort described by Rawls in *Political Liberalism*, however, will have to await another generation, but I have no doubt that it will come, perhaps sooner than anyone realizes.