Copyright and Trademark Laws

Answer:  The melodies of both countries' national anthems  (choose whichever term you like)

• are inspired
• borrow
• build on
• plagiarize
• steal
• pirate

previous popular musical works of their time.

"O Canada", composed by Calixa Lavallee in 1880, bears a great resemblance to the "Marsch der Priester" (March of the Priests), from Mozart's The Magic Flute.  Click to listen:

O Canada

I have posted a new paper on SSRN.  The paper, titled Substitution and Schumpeterian Effects Over the Lifecycle of Copyrighted Works, develops the following two key insights. First, copyrighted works are affected by two types of competitive forces: substitutive competition and Schumpeterian competition. Second, the relevant magnitude of each of these competitive forces changes at various points over the lifecycle of copyrighted works. The earlier stages of a work's lifecycle are dominated by substitution effects, whereby many other works can function as very close substitutes. As the work develops to a full product, to which many other inputs have been added, it becomes less easily substitutable. This process intensifies as network effects of various kinds secure successful works' market position and render them less vulnerable to competition from close imitations. The competitive threat to which such works may be exposed becomes more Schumpeterian in nature: competition from other works which offer something new, and potentially preferable. Generally, copyright law unequivocally discourages merely substitutive competition, but is much less interested in discouraging Schumpeterian competition. This paper's time-based analysis provides both a justification to this distinction, as well as grounds to evaluating various existing rules and doctrines.

Modern trademark scholarship and jurisprudence view trademark law as an institution aimed at improving the amount and quality of information available in the marketplace.  Under this paradigm—known as the search-costs theory of trademarks—trademarks are socially beneficial because they reduce consumer search costs, and as a consequence provide producers with an incentive to maintain their goods and services at defined and persistent qualities.

Working within this paradigm, my recent paper refines the search-cost theory of trademarks.  It highlights an important point whose significance hitherto has largely escaped notice, namely that reducing search costs and providing incentives to maintain quality are distinct functions, although they are related.  The paper first develops a distinction between two functions: the linguistic and the trust functions of trademarks.  It then shows how recognizing their distinct nature enriches our understanding of trademark law and provides a better framework for evaluating the normative strength of various trademark rules and doctrines.  The paper demonstrates how different rules can be regarded as normatively stronger or weaker depending on the degree to which they are compatible with both, one, or neither of these functions.  

Originally posted on Prof. Katz's blog

In a lengthy post last week, Barry Sookman responded, and attempted to refute, Michael Geist's analysis of the implications of the recent Supreme Court of Canada's decisions on Access Copyright and its business model. In a nutshell, Michael Geist argued that schools, which already have directly negotiated licenses with numerous publishers, can now "rely more heavily on fair dealing for the copying that takes place on campus and in the classroom. This includes copies made by teachers for students for instructional purposes, copies that previously formed a core part of Access Copyright's claim of the necessity of a licence." Michael Geist never argued that the Supreme Court held that all copying in schools is fair dealing and that a license is never required. Rather, Michael Geist’s essential point is that Access Copyright's very restrictive licenses offer very little beyond what is either already licensed (and often paid for) or what might very likely be regarded as fair dealing anyway.

I have posted a new paper on SSRN.  The paper is based on a presentation that I gave at the Exhaustion and First Sale in IP Conference held at Santa Clara Law School last November.  Here’s the abstract:

The first sale doctrine (or exhaustion) limits the exclusive rights that survive the initial authorized sale of an item protected by such rights.  The first sale doctrine has always been under pressure by owners of intellectual property rights, and courts have never been able to precisely outline its contours, or fully articulate its rationale. Recently, and somewhat counter-intuitively, insights borrowed from modern antitrust law and economics are invoked to provide a seemingly robust theoretical foundation for undermining exhaustion rules or narrowing their scope, and thereby strengthen IP owners’ control over downstream distribution and use of the goods they produce.